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INTRODUCTION 
The documentary film Crude, directed by award-winning filmmaker 
Joseph Berlinger,1 tells the story of a class action lawsuit brought by 
thousands of Ecuadorians against the oil company Chevron, alleging 
that the company’s systematic contamination of a portion of the Ama-
zon jungle increased the rates of cancer, leukemia, birth defects, and 
other health problems for the indigenous people of the region.2  Ber-
linger and his crew spent three years filming but captured only a small 
portion of the ongoing fight between the Ecuadorians and Chevron.3  
By the time Berlinger’s cameras arrived, the legal battle was already a 
dozen years old, and a title screen at the end of Crude predicts that the 
litigation could last another decade.4  The film premiered at the 2009 
Sundance Film Festival5 and went on to earn dozens of nominations 
and awards from film festival juries and critics’ organizations around 
the world.6 
In 2010, Chevron and, separately, two of Chevron’s lawyers who 
were facing criminal charges in Ecuador for falsifying documents,7 
 
1 Berlinger is best known for two other legal documentaries, BROTHER’S KEEPER 
(American Playhouse Theatrical Films 1992) and his trilogy of films about the “West 
Memphis Three,” beginning with PARADISE LOST:  THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN 
HOOD HILLS (HBO 1996), which brought national attention to, and contributed to the 
release of, three men who had been imprisoned for eighteen years.  Campbell Robert-
son, Rare Deal Frees 3 in ’93 Arkansas Child Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at A1.  
Berlinger has won, among other prizes, two Emmys, a Peabody, and the Audience 
Award at the Sundance Film Festival, as well as awards from the Directors Guild of 
America, the New York Film Critics Circle, the National Board of Review, and the In-
dependent Spirit Awards.  About Joe Berlinger, BERLINGER + SINOFSKY, http:// 
www.berlinger-sinofsky.com/#/berlinger/about (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
2 See CRUDE:  THE REAL PRICE OF OIL (Third Eye Motion Picture Co. 2009); Synop-
sis, CRUDE:  PRODUCTION NOTES (2009), available at http://crudethemovie.com/blog/ 
wp-content/uploads/2009/08/CRUDE-Press-Kit-081909.pdf (providing a brief overview 
of the case against Chevron and the making of the film that documents it).  Other 
groups of Ecuadorians have brought different lawsuits alleging similar charges, includ-
ing suits against the claimed polluter Texaco prior to its acquisition by its successor in 
interest Chevron.  See infra Part II. 
3 Synopsis, CRUDE:  PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2.  
4 CRUDE, supra note 2; see also Historical Timeline of Events, CRUDE:  PRODUCTION 
NOTES, supra note 2 (noting that the first class action suit was filed in 1993 and that 
principal photography for the film began in 2005). 
5 About the Production, CRUDE:  PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2. 
6 For a list of Crude’s awards, nominations, and festival screenings, see Awards & 
Festivals, CRUDE:  A JOE BERLINGER FILM, http://www.crudethemovie.com/awards-and-
festivals (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
7 Hereinafter I will refer to Chevron and the lawyers facing criminal charges col-
lectively as “Chevron.” 
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moved to subpoena nearly six-hundred hours of raw footage, or “out-
takes,” that Berlinger did not include in the completed film.8  Chevron 
sought to prove that the plaintiffs’ lawyers exerted improper influence 
over judges and experts involved in the proceedings in Ecuador 
through ex parte communications, and it argued that Berlinger’s 
footage contained evidence of this misconduct.9  Berlinger attempted 
to quash the subpoenas on the ground that he was protected by the 
journalists’ privilege.10 
The district court ordered Berlinger to turn over all of his out-
takes11—the largest mandate to turn over outtakes ever ordered by a 
U.S. court.12  In doing so, the court revealed its misunderstanding of 
outtakes and how they should be treated under the existing journal-
ists’ privilege doctrine.  The Second Circuit’s standard for obtaining 
nonconfidential material from journalists, set forth in Gonzales v. NBC, 
requires petitioners to prove that the material sought is “of likely rele-
vance to a significant issue in the case” and “not reasonably obtainable 
from other available sources.”13  The district court in the Berlinger liti-
gation, after assuming that this qualified privilege applies to inde-
pendent documentary filmmakers, narrowed the protection of jour-
nalistic work product by collapsing the two-pronged Gonzales test into 
 
8 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).  The motion was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, seeking discovery for use in 
a proceeding in a foreign tribunal.  709 F. Supp. 2d at 289-90. 
9 Id. at 295-96. 
10 Id. at 285, 293.  While the Second Circuit does recognize a qualified privilege 
for journalists, it has repeatedly declined to explain whether this privilege is derived 
from the First Amendment or from federal common law.  See United States v. Treacy, 
639 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the court had “previously declined to re-
solve [the issue] absent any Congressional retrenchment of the privilege” and again 
“declin[ing] to wade into these constitutional waters”). 
11 In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 299. 
12 See Brief for ABC, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents-Appellants 
at 1-2, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966), 
2010 WL 2648173, at *1-2 (“The District Court’s order granted an application by . . . 
Chevron . . . to subpoena what appears to be the largest amount of film outtakes in 
American history . . . .”); Norman Lear, Was Oil Named ‘Crude’ Because of the Way Oil 
Companies Do Business?, HUFFINGTON POST ( June 8, 2010, 2:44 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/norman-lear/was-oil-named-crude-becau_b_604741.html (describing 
the district court’s order as “the largest turnover of a reporter’s work product in Amer-
ican history”).  Compare the six-hundred hours of Berlinger’s footage with the few 
hours, at most, of interview footage ordered discoverable in United States v. LaRouche 
Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1177 (1st Cir. 1988), and United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 
966 (5th Cir. 1998), as well as the footage of the short traffic stop ordered discoverable 
in Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999). 
13 194 F.3d at 36. 
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a general standard of “likely relevance” for outtakes, and lowered the 
bar for what constitutes relevance.14  The Second Circuit narrowed15 
but nonetheless affirmed the order.16  The Second Circuit further 
ruled that because Berlinger appeared to be subject to the influence 
of his filmmaking subjects, he lacked the editorial independence nec-
essary to qualify for the journalists’ privilege.17 
This Comment argues that the courts’ improper assumptions about 
outtakes and documentary filmmaking led to an inappropriate weak-
ening of the journalists’ privilege as applied to nonfiction filmmakers 
and other noninstitutional media entities.  While journalistic work 
product should not be protected in all cases, the courts’ imprecise ap-
plication of the relevant standard treats documentarians like second-
class journalists.  This imprecision also endangers the future produc-
tion of independent, investigative documentaries, which warrant pro-
tection for the same reasons that courts embrace a qualified privilege 
for other kinds of journalism.   
Part I traces the evolution of the journalists’ privilege in the Se-
cond Circuit.  Part II discusses the opinions in the Berlinger litigation.  
Part III argues that the Second Circuit’s new “independence” test will 
result in courts discriminating against journalists not on account of 
their output but because of their motivations and associations.  Part IV 
then considers several ways in which filmmakers might approach pro-
jects in this new legal landscape to better protect their footage and 
their subjects.  Such approaches include signing agreements with sub-
jects, offering subjects final cut approval, destroying unreleased foot-
age after the film has been released, and altering filming techniques. 
Under the Second Circuit’s weakened protections, filmmakers will 
not find any effective legal means of preventing discovery of their 
footage, short of altering their filmmaking practices or destroying un-
used footage—methods that impose their own costs and may affect 
the quantity and quality of documentaries that explore the justice sys-
tem in action.  The best way to meet the needs of the justice system 
while minimizing the impact on the production of documentaries is to 
apply the existing journalists’ privilege doctrine properly.  Once 
courts recognize and correct common misunderstandings about out-
takes and video evidence, documentary filmmakers can be treated the 
 
14 See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 295-98; see also infra Section II.A. 
15 See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
16 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2011). 
17 Id. at 308.  
ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:08 PM 
2012] The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege 869 
same as other newsgatherers who serve the vital role of investigating 
and disseminating valuable information to the public. 
I.  FROM BRANZBURG TO BERLINGER 
Today, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have shield 
laws that grant journalists either an absolute or qualified privilege 
concerning confidential sources; roughly two-thirds of these laws also 
protect journalists’ work product, such as outtakes.18  Twelve other 
states recognize either a constitutional or a common law privilege for 
reporters, at least in civil cases.19  Most federal courts recognize that 
under a federal common law privilege, journalists need not disclose 
confidential sources.20  But the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have reject-
ed extending the privilege to nonconfidential journalistic work prod-
uct,21 and the Sixth Circuit rejects any type of federal journalists’ privi-
 
18 See Shield Laws and Protection of Sources by State, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/shieldmap.html (last visited Dec. 15, 
2011); see also Anthony L. Fargo & Paul McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law?  How Rule 
501 Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1347, 1355-57 
(2007) (surveying state privilege statutes and noting that about two-thirds of the laws 
protect journalists’ work product); RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas:  Impact, 
Perception, and Legal Protection in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. 
REV. 317, 384-85 & n.263 (2009) (listing state shield statutes).  New York’s shield law, 
typical of other states, provides for “[a]bsolute protection for confidential news” and 
“qualified protection” for nonconfidential news.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)–(c) 
(McKinney 2010).  Those seeking nonconfidential information from journalists must 
show that the news is (1) “highly material and relevant,” (2) “critical or necessary to 
the maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or proof of an issue thereto material,” and 
(3) “not obtainable from any alternative source.”  Id. § 79-h(c).  The act defines a pro-
fessional journalist as “one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, prepar-
ing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended 
for . . . dissemination to the public” via a professional medium or agency.  Id. § 79-
h(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
19 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(Tatel, J., concurring) (stating that forty-nine states and the District of Columbia rec-
ognize some form of the journalists’ privilege). 
20 See Fargo & McAdoo, supra note 18, at 1359-62 (summarizing federal privilege 
law); Michael Fitzsimmons, Casenote, Defending the Informers:  The Media’s Right to Protect 
Non-Confidential Source Information Following United States v. Smith, 6 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 295, 305 n.55 (1999) (listing and categorizing circuit court decisions on the 
journalists’ privilege). 
21 See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding “little 
support in either the plurality or the concurring opinions of Branzburg” for a reporter’s 
privilege to nonconfidential journalistic work product); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 
530, 532-34 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that when a journalist tries to protect noncon-
fidential information, the court should not focus on privilege and instead “should 
simply make sure that a subpoena duces tecum directed to the media, like any other 
subpoena duces tecum, is reasonable in the circumstances”). 
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lege.22  In addition, the Department of Justice has adopted its own 
guidelines limiting the circumstances in which prosecutors should 
subpoena journalists, regardless of the jurisdiction or controlling law.23  
Any proper discussion of the journalists’ privilege, however, must 
begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg. 
A.  Branzburg v. Hayes 
In the landmark 1972 Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes, the 
Court declined to hold that reporters could avoid testifying before 
state or federal grand juries by invoking the First Amendment.24  
However, Justice White, writing for four other Justices,25 noted that the 
First Amendment might protect journalists who were the subject of 
bad-faith investigations or harassment by government officials for rea-
sons unrelated to law enforcement.26 
Justice Powell, who joined Justice White’s opinion, wrote separate-
ly to “emphasize . . . the limited nature of the Court’s holding.”27  He 
also noted that a reporter is entitled to a First Amendment remedy if 
 
22 Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 
583-86 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the “balancing of interests” that occurs in journal-
ists’ privilege cases “should not then be elevated . . . to the status of a first amendment 
constitutional privilege”). 
23 The guidelines direct prosecutors, prior to seeking a subpoena in a criminal case 
or a civil case of substantial importance, to take steps such as making reasonable at-
tempts to obtain the information from other sources, entering into negotiations with 
the media, and establishing through use of nonmedia sources reasonable grounds for 
the belief that the information sought is essential.  28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2011).  
24 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972). The Court considered the consolidated appeals of 
three journalists who witnessed criminal or potentially criminal activity and who were 
asked by prosecutors to reveal sources or information that the reporters had agreed to 
keep confidential.  Id. at 667-79; see also David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources Recon-
sidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 891-99 (2009) (arguing that the facts of Branzburg did not 
present the case for constitutional protection in the best light and detailing the “meli-
orations” and “unraveling” of the decision over the years); Fitzsimmons, supra note 20, 
at 300-05 (describing the Branzburg opinions in detail). 
25 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665.  Even though the Court’s opinion represented the 
views of five Justices, some commentators refer to Branzburg as a “plurality” decision or 
its equivalent due to Justice Powell’s enigmatic concurrence, which purported to en-
dorse the majority but also espoused a case-by-case analysis.  See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, 
The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources:  A Curious Study in “Reverse Federalism,” 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 1424-28 (2008) (highlighting the ambiguities of the Powell 
concurrence and how media advocates “exploited” them until courts began to “second 
guess” the plurality reading of the case in the 1990s); Fitzsimmons, supra note 20, at 
301 (stating outright that the opinion is a “plurality”).  
26 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08. 
27 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:08 PM 
2012] The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege 871 
he is subject to the harassment of bad-faith investigations, or if the in-
formation he is asked to reveal bears “only a remote and tenuous rela-
tionship to the subject of the investigation, or if . . . his testimony im-
plicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of 
law enforcement.”28  Powell insisted that courts should balance the 
need for a free press against the general obligation to provide testi-
mony in criminal cases on a case-by-case basis.29 
Following Branzburg, many commentators and courts accepted the 
argument that, by grouping Justice Powell with the four dissenting Jus-
tices who endorsed constitutional protections for journalists, a majori-
ty of the Justices had endorsed a limited journalists’ privilege ground-
ed in the First Amendment.30  As a result, in general, the scope of the 
journalists’ privilege expanded after Branzburg.31  In McKevitt v. Pallasch, 
Judge Posner criticized this reading and the court decisions that em-
braced it.32  He noted that Justice Powell concurred not only in the 
judgment but also in Justice White’s opinion, which rendered it a le-
gitimate majority opinion.33  But as states adopted their own shield 
laws for journalists and the Department of Justice issued its own sub-
poena guidelines, Branzburg gradually became less of an interpretive 
problem for the courts.34 
B. Second Circuit Jurisprudence Following Branzburg 
Following Branzburg, the Second Circuit expanded protection for 
journalists, primarily to avoid the chilling effect that would follow if 
prosecutors were able to use journalists as “an investigative arm of the 
 
28 Id. at 710. 
29 Id. 
30 See Anderson, supra note 24, at 894 (discussing this grouping of opinions and 
Judge Posner’s criticism of it in McKevitt v. Pallasch); Recent Case, Lee v. Department of 
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1924 & n.6 (2006) (noting the grouping and listing 
cases advancing this argument).  
31 See Recent Case, Lee v. Department of Justice, supra note 30, at 1923-24 (“In the 
years following [Branzburg] most circuits . . . creat[ed] heightened newsgathering protec-
tions for the press by construing Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg as allowing 
qualified journalist privileges.”). 
32 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (criticizing other cases that either “essentially 
ignore Branzburg” or “audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter’s 
privilege”). 
33 See id. at 531-32. 
34 See Anderson, supra note 24, at 892-93 (noting that a “major showdown over 
confidential sources” was averted due to, among other things, the Department of Jus-
tice’s adoption of subpoena guidelines and the increasing number of states adopting 
shield laws). 
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government.”35  The Second Circuit’s first major post-Branzburg case 
concerned Alfred Balk, a journalist and journalism professor who re-
fused to identify a source for a Saturday Evening Post article he wrote 
about racially discriminatory real estate practices in Chicago.36  The 
civil rights class action plaintiffs sought the identity of Balk’s source as 
evidence of discriminatory practices known as “blockbusting.”37  Balk, 
who had promised his source anonymity, argued that the First 
Amendment granted him a privilege against testifying, and the district 
court, deciding the case prior to Branzburg, ruled that Balk could not be 
compelled to reveal the identity of his source.38  Judge Bonsal of the 
Southern District of New York concluded that the plaintiffs had shown 
neither “that all other available sources [had] been exhausted” nor that 
disclosure was “essential to the protection of the public interest.”39 
The Second Circuit, ruling after Branzburg, affirmed the district 
court’s decision in holding that the First Amendment protects jour-
nalists from revealing confidential sources if “the public interest in 
non-disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources outweighs the 
public and private interest in compelled testimony.”40  The court con-
cluded that no “compelling concern” here outweighed the First 
Amendment interest in maintaining confidentiality.41  In its discussion 
of this interest, the court stated that “[c]ompelled disclosure of confi-
dential sources unquestionably threatens a journalist’s ability to secure 
information that is made available to him only on a confidential basis” 
and that the deterrent effect of a contrary ruling would “threaten[] 
freedom of the press and the public’s need to be informed,” particu-
larly in the context of investigative reporting.42  The Second Circuit 
easily distinguished Branzburg as being limited to the disclosure of 
 
35 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
36 Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972).  
37 Id.  Blockbusting is an umbrella term for a number of practices designed to ma-
nipulate real estate prices in order to affect the racial, ethnic, or religious composition 
of a neighborhood.  See Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 214 
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (defining “blockbusting” as “stimulat[ing] and prey[ing] on racial big-
otry and fear by initiating and encouraging rumors that negroes were about to move 
into a given area, that all non-negroes would leave, and that the market values of prop-
erties would descend to ‘panic prices’”). 
38 Baker v. F & F Inv., 339 F. Supp. 942, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
39 Id.  
40 Baker, 470 F.2d at 783. 
41 Id. at 785. 
42 Id. at 782. 
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confidential sources before grand juries investigating criminal activity, 
and declined to apply it in a civil case.43 
In von Bulow v. von Bulow, the Second Circuit continued to ex-
pand the privilege by broadening the class of individuals who could 
invoke its protection and stating explicitly that the privilege extended 
to nonconfidential information.44  In von Bulow, Andrea Reynolds, a 
friend of Martha von Bulow, attempted to invoke the journalists’ privi-
lege to prevent disclosure of an unpublished manuscript of a book she 
was writing about the civil litigation between Martha and Claus von 
Bulow.45  The Second Circuit concluded that anyone, regardless of 
whether she was a member of the “institutionalized press,” could in-
voke the journalists’ privilege as long as she, “at the inception of the 
newsgathering process,” intended to disseminate to the public the in-
formation obtained from her sources.46  The court stated that prior 
experience as a journalist was not required; rather, the inquiry should 
focus on whether Reynolds was “involved in activities traditionally as-
sociated with the gathering and dissemination of news.”47  Nor did the 
court limit the privilege to those working in a particular medium, such 
as newspapers or magazines, because “[t]he press in its historic con-
notation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle 
of information and opinion.”48  By focusing exclusively on whether the 
information gatherer’s intent was to disseminate her work to the pub-
lic, the Second Circuit expressly stated for the first time that the privi-
lege protected both confidential and nonconfidential information.49 
 
43 See id. at 784 (“Branzburg . . . is only of tangential relevance to this case.”). 
44 See 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he relationship between the journalist 
and his source may be confidential or nonconfidential for the purposes of the privilege.”). 
45 Id. at 138.  The civil dispute between the von Bulows alleged that Claus put Mar-
tha into a permanent comatose state “by injecting her surreptitiously with insulin and 
other drugs.”  Id. at 139. 
46 Id. at 142, 144. 
47 Id. at 142. 
48 Id. at 144 (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).  The fed-
eral privacy law, designed to protect First Amendment activities, forbids government 
actors from searching or seizing journalistic work product and, like von Bulow, defines 
the privilege broadly.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2006).  The statute covers “any work 
product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to dis-
seminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public 
communication.”  Id. 
49 811 F.2d at 142.  The court noted that other federal courts had reached the same 
conclusion and quoted the Middle District of Florida for the proposition that with re-
gard to materials developed by a reporter in preparation for an article, the “nonconfi-
dentiality of [a] source was utterly irrelevant to [the] chilling effect on [the] flow of 
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The court nonetheless declined to extend the privilege to Reyn-
olds on the ground that she did not have the requisite intent to dis-
seminate the information to the public when she undertook her book 
project.50  The court found that other impulses had motivated Reyn-
olds to gather information about the von Bulows, including her desire 
to bolster the credibility of the von Bulow children in support of the 
underlying litigation as well as her desire to secure her own peace of 
mind.51  The court noted that only on “rare occasions” had “persons 
who are not journalists in the traditional sense of that term” success-
fully invoked the journalists’ privilege.52  But the court’s permissive 
test was a signal that “lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic 
researchers, and dramatists,” among others, deserved the same pro-
tection as a veteran reporter for the New York Times.53  The ruling af-
firmed the importance of nontraditional journalists gathering infor-
mation for the public’s benefit. 
In United States v. Cutler, the Second Circuit, confronting a crimi-
nal defendant seeking outtakes from a television interview, set a high 
standard for compelling disclosure.54  The case involved a subpoena 
for outtakes of a television interview with an attorney facing criminal 
contempt charges, which the reporters and television station sought to 
quash.55  The court recited the “well settled” proposition that in order 
“to protect the important interests of reporters and the public in pre-
serving the confidentiality of journalists’ sources,” disclosure of jour-
nalistic work product may be compelled in civil cases “only upon a 
 
information to press and public.”  Id. at 143 (quoting Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 
1299, 1300, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 See id. at 145-46 (“[O]ur central inquiry as to whether Reynolds is entitled to 
claim a journalist’s privilege must be answered in the negative.”). 
51 Id. at 139. 
52 Id. at 143.  For example, in 1977, the Tenth Circuit confronted the case of Ar-
thur Hirsch, a freelance reporter and film student who, as a nonparty witness, tried to 
invoke the journalists’ privilege to avoid revealing confidential sources.  Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 434 (10th Cir. 1977).  The court held that Hirsch—
who had formed a production company with a UCLA professor and a fellow film stu-
dent in order to make a documentary film about the death of Karen Silkwood—could 
invoke the privilege to protect research he had done in anticipation of making the 
film.  Id. at 435-37.  The court reasoned that Hirsch spent “considerable time and ef-
fort in obtaining facts . . . in preparation of [making] the film.  It strikes us as some-
what anomalous that the appellee would argue that he is not a genuine reporter enti-
tled to the privilege.”  Id. at 436-37. 
53 Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144-45 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 
(1972)). 
54 6 F.3d 67, 68, 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1993). 
55 Id. at 69-70. 
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clear and specific showing that the information is:  highly material and 
relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not 
obtainable from other available sources.”56  The court ordered the tele-
vision station to turn over the outtakes on the ground that the footage 
was “clearly relevant,” necessary to defend against a criminal charge 
and, other than the attorney’s own testimony, “probably the only sig-
nificant proof regarding his assertedly criminal behavior.”57 
The years following Cutler represented the high-water mark of the 
journalists’ privilege in civil cases in the Second Circuit.58  Although 
the Second Circuit had not expressly ruled that journalists—as de-
fined under the expansive von Bulow formulation—were entitled to a 
strong privilege for confidential information and a qualified privilege 
for nonconfidential information, district courts in the Second Circuit 
assumed as much throughout the 1980s and 1990s.59  However, begin-
ning in 1999 with Gonzales v. NBC, the Second Circuit started to con-
tract the privilege in civil cases.60 
The Gonzales case centered on hidden camera footage recorded by 
Dateline NBC, a news magazine show, for a program about law en-
forcement abuses, namely unwarranted traffic stops of out-of-state or 
minority drivers in Louisiana.61  An undercover NBC reporter rigged a 
car with hidden cameras, set his car on cruise control below the speed 
limit, and obeyed all traffic laws.62  The reporter was stopped by Loui-
siana Deputy Sheriff Darrell Pierce, and some footage of the stop was 
aired on NBC.63  In a separate incident, Plaintiffs Albert and Mary 
Gonzales were stopped by Deputy Pierce and, after filing a civil rights 
action against Deputy Pierce for stopping them on the basis of their 
 
56 Id. at 71 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 
(2d Cir. 1983)). 
57 Id. at 73. 
58 The Second Circuit later observed that Cutler itself was a retreat from the high-
water mark of United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), which had “set too high 
a bar for overcoming the privilege in criminal cases.”  United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 
32, 43 (2d Cir. 2011).  In Treacy, the Second Circuit held that “the showing required to 
overcome the journalist’s privilege [for nonconfidential information] is the same in a 
criminal case as it is in a civil case—namely, the showing required by Gonzales.”  Id. 
59 See Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 34 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing fourteen district 
court opinions that assumed and enforced the privilege for nonconfidential material). 
60 194 F.3d 29. 
61 Id. at 31. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
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Hispanic origin, sought access to NBC’s outtakes of the Deputy Pierce 
traffic stop filmed for Dateline.64 
Reviewing the district court’s motion to compel disclosure, the 
Second Circuit explicitly held that in a civil case nonconfidential in-
formation is protected by a qualified privilege.65  In isolation, such a 
holding would have strengthened the journalists’ privilege in the Se-
cond Circuit.  But the court further ruled that the privilege could be 
overcome upon a lesser showing than would be necessary to obtain 
confidential information.66  This holding was curious. The court de-
scribed at length the “broader concerns” implicated by the journalists’ 
privilege, including the “pivotal function of reporters to collect infor-
mation for public dissemination”67 and the “paramount public interest 
in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press 
capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controver-
sial matters.”68   
The court concluded that these concerns “are relevant regardless 
whether the information sought from the press is confidential.”69  It 
posited that widespread exposure of press files would burden the 
press, increase costs for the media, deter sources from speaking to the 
press or increase their insistence on confidentiality, encourage jour-
nalists to dispose of files containing potentially valuable information, 
and lend to the press the appearance of being an investigative arm of 
the judicial system.70  Yet the court then proceeded to require a lesser 
showing in order to gain access to nonconfidential information.71  The 
 
64 Id. at 30-31. 
65 See id. at 30 (reaffirming the existence of a “qualified privilege for nonconfiden-
tial press information”). 
66 Id.  The case came to the Second Circuit on an unusual posture.  Originally, the 
district court held that a qualified privilege existed for nonconfidential information, 
but the requirements for overcoming the privilege had not been met.  Id.  The Second 
Circuit affirmed on the ground that no qualified privilege existed for nonconfidential 
information.  Id.  But after a motion for a rehearing by NBC, the Second Circuit “re-
considered [its] opinion” and explicitly reaffirmed the existence of a qualified privi-
lege for nonconfidential information.  Id. 
67 Id. at 35 (quoting In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 
1982)). 
68 Id. at 35 (quoting Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 35-36.  For an in-depth discussion of Gonzales and, in particular, the curios-
ity of requiring a lesser showing for nonconfidential information, see generally Anthony 
L. Fargo, Reconsidering the Federal Journalist’s Privilege for Non-Confidential Information:  
Gonzales v. NBC, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 355 (2001).  Fargo points out that the 
Third and Ninth Circuits also agree “in principle” with the Second Circuit that the 
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court merely stated that “where the protection of confidential sources 
is not involved, the nature of the press interest protected by the privi-
lege is narrower.”72  For nonconfidential information, a civil litigant is 
entitled to discovery upon a showing that the materials are “of likely 
relevance to a significant issue in the case” and “not reasonably ob-
tainable from other available sources.”73  The court focused on the 
circumstances surrounding the conveyance of information, rather 
than the effect disclosure would have on the press, and concluded 
that if information was not communicated in confidence, journalists 
should not be able to shield it from court proceedings so easily.74 
Applying its newly minted test to the facts, the court held that the 
Gonzaleses were entitled to the outtakes.75  The footage was “clearly 
relevant to a significant issue in the case”:  whether Deputy Pierce en-
gaged in a pattern of stopping vehicles without probable cause.76  The 
court also found that the information contained in the outtakes was 
not available from other sources “because they can provide unim-
peachably objective evidence of Deputy Pierce’s conduct.”77  A deposi-
tion, the court noted, would not be an adequate substitute for the in-
formation that could be obtained from the videotapes.78 
The Gonzales court got a couple of things right and one thing 
wrong about outtakes.  First, it recognized that the information con-
tained within the outtakes was conceptually separate from the physical 
videotapes possessed by NBC.  The court spoke of “the evidence in the 
tapes” and the fact that “the outtakes contain information that is not 
reasonably obtainable from other available sources.”79  Second, in de-
ciding whether the information contained within the outtakes was 
available from other sources, the court considered at least one other 
source that might be available.80  It did not, however, discuss what other 
efforts the Gonzaleses made, or could have made, to find evidence of 
 
privilege for nonconfidential information is weaker than that for confidential material.  
Id. at 387. 
72 Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 32, 36 (emphasis added).  For a discussion of how this distinction was 
blurred in the district court’s opinion in the Berlinger case, see infra Section III.D. 
80 See Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36 (considering the adequacy of a deposition as another 
available source for the information). 
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Deputy Pierce’s conduct.  The court ultimately rejected the adequacy 
of a deposition as a substitute for the outtakes.81 
But the court revealed its misunderstanding of video and other 
photographic evidence by describing outtakes as providing “unim-
peachably objective evidence.”82  Section III.D of this Comment dis-
cusses in detail the fallacy of treating video footage as unquestionably 
objective evidence, but it is sufficient to note at this juncture that a 
wealth of film scholars, legal commentators, and documentary 
filmmakers reject the notion that video and photographs have objec-
tive meaning independent of context.83  This suggests that visual evi-
dence should be treated as substantive evidence, rather than as a spe-
cial class of demonstrative proof.  This seemingly small misstep laid 
the groundwork for further mistakes by the Berlinger court. 
II.  CHEVRON CORP. V. BERLINGER 
In 1964, Texaco began drilling for oil in the Amazon rainforest of 
eastern Ecuador.84  There, the company built and operated oil fields 
and a trans-Ecuadorian pipeline for more than a quarter century.85  In 
1976, the government of Ecuador, through its state-owned oil company, 
Petroecuador, became the majority stakeholder in the oil consortium 
that had been formed to conduct the oil operations in the country 
and that was owned in part and operated by Texaco.86  Petroecuador 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257, 
1297 (2010) [hereinafter Silbey, Evidence Verité] (“Photographs . . . should be admit-
ted as substantive evidence . . . and analyzed for their assertive message, rather than 
considered demonstrative aids or real evidence.”); Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Crit-
ics:  New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 496-99, 519-20 
(2004) [hereinafter Silbey, Judges as Film Critics] (criticizing the judicial approach to 
filmic evidence that treats film as if it were an “unimpeachable eyewitness,” and argu-
ing that judges miscategorize film as demonstrative evidence, rather than substantive 
and assertive in nature); Alison Lynn Tuley, Note, Outtakes, Hidden Cameras, and the 
First Amendment:  A Reporter’s Privilege, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 1817, 1832 (1997) (argu-
ing that judges view video evidence as a category of its own, making it more likely that 
outtakes will be treated differently than other journalistic work product); see also Errol 
Morris, Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (July 10, 2007, 2:14 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/pictures-are-supposed-to-be-worth-a- 
thousand-words (criticizing the common belief that photographs reveal “an objective 
piece of reality” and arguing that photographs only contain truth in context “with re-
spect to statements we make about them or the questions we might ask of them”).   
84 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d. 283, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
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assumed operational control in 1990 and purchased all of Texaco’s 
Ecuadorean assets in 1992.87  The next year, 30,000 Ecuadoreans filed 
a federal class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York 
against Texaco, alleging that the company had dumped billions of gal-
lons of oil and inadequately treated toxic waste into the Amazon ba-
sin, destroying its natural habitats and biodiversity and harming the 
indigenous community.88  One of the tribes most affected by the oil 
production was the Cofán nation.  By 2006, of the 15,000 tribe mem-
bers who once lived on their ancestral land between the Pisurie and 
Aguarico Rivers, only a few hundred remained, many suffering from 
cancer, birth defects, or other diseases stemming from, at least in part, 
a lack of clean drinking water.89  The case was dismissed in 2001 on 
grounds of forum non conveniens.90  Chevron inherited Texaco’s lia-
bilities when it merged with Texaco in 2001, and, in 2003, a new 
group of Ecuadorians, including some of the plaintiffs from the previ-
ous action, brought suit under Ecuadorian law against Chevron in 
Lago Agrio, Ecuador.91  Throughout the litigation, Chevron contend-
ed that there was no evidence of an increase in cancer rate, no evi-
dence that cancer was linked to the oil production, and no evidence 
that any environmental harm was caused by Texaco, as opposed to 
Petroecuador.92 
Steven Donziger, an American attorney and one of the lead coun-
sel for the plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation, sought to raise 
awareness of the case and put public and media pressure on Chevron 
by inviting journalists, filmmakers, and celebrity activists to report on 
or publicize the environmental devastation in Ecuador.93  In 2005, 
 
87 Press Release, Chevron Corp., Ecuador Lawsuit Report Has Fabricated Evidence, 
Tainted by Political Pressure (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://investor.chevron.com/ 
phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1197255. 
88 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93-7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 
1994). 
89 See CRUDE, supra note 2; see also Juan Forero, ‘Gringo Chief’ Helps Craft an Indian 
Community’s Success Story, WASH. POST, June 21, 2010, at A10 (estimating the current 
population of the tribe in Ecuador at 1200); Programa Selva Amazonica Ecuatoriana, SEL-
VA VIDA SIN FRONTERAS, http://www.selvavidasinfronteras.org/contenidos.php?menu= 
39&idiom=2 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (estimating the current population at 700, down 
from 15,000 in the 1960s). 
90 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
91 See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (discussing the procedural history of the 
Lago Agrio litigation); see also CRUDE, supra note 2. 
92 CRUDE, supra note 2. 
93 See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (noting that Donziger approached Ber-
linger to make a film about the litigation); see also CRUDE, supra note 2 (depicting 
Donziger’s efforts to pitch an article to Vanity Fair, orchestrate press conferences in the 
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Donziger met Berlinger, who eventually agreed to embark on a long-
term documentary project about the litigation and the underlying 
ecological disaster.94  Berlinger and his crew shot more than six-
hundred hours of footage over the next three years,95 during which 
they enjoyed “extraordinary access”96 to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.  The fi-
nal version of Crude focuses on the evidentiary phase of the trial and 
includes:  interviews with Ecuadoreans affected by the oil production, 
scenes of plaintiffs’ lawyers strategizing about the litigation, interviews 
with Chevron lawyers and spokespeople, scenes of judicial inspections 
of the oil pits created by Texaco, and footage of an independent 
court-appointed expert as he prepared a nonbinding global damage 
assessment to quantify the damage attributable to Texaco.97  The film 
concludes with the expert completing his report for the judge, in 
which he finds Texaco responsible for up to $27 billion in damages.98 
A.  The District Court Orders Discovery 
Chevron filed an application for subpoenas in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, seeking the outtakes of Crude to provide evidence of 
misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs’ lawyers during the underlying 
Lago Agrio litigation.99  Chevron argued that the footage was “highly 
likely to be directly relevant” to the Lago Agrio litigation.100  Berlinger 
argued in response that his footage was protected by the journalists’ 
privilege.101  Judge Kaplan, writing for the court, first determined that 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 the district court had the authority to issue an 
order to compel discovery of the evidence for use in a foreign pro-
 
United States, and introduce Trudie Styler, environmental activist and wife of the mu-
sician Sting, to the people of Ecuador). 
94 See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (describing the meeting as Donziger 
“solicit[ing]” Berlinger “to tell his clients’ story”).  The court’s description of the meet-
ing as a solicitation is potentially misleading, however, because it suggests that 
Donziger financed, or offered to finance, the documentary, which he did not.  See infra 
notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
95 See In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 287. 
96 Synopsis, CRUDE:  PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2. 
97 See CRUDE, supra note 2. 
98 See id. 
99 In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 289-90. 
100 Id. at 290. 
101 Id. at 293. 
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ceeding.102  The court then turned to whether the journalists’ privilege 
prevented the application of § 1782 in this case.103 
First, the court noted that the Second Circuit had not addressed 
the issue of whether the journalists’ privilege extended to documen-
tary filmmakers.104  The court did note, however, that under von Bulow 
an individual “involved in activities traditionally associated with the 
gathering and dissemination of news” may still assert the qualified 
privilege even if he is not a “member of the institutionalized press.”105  
Applying the von Bulow test, the court assumed that because Berlinger 
gathered information about a “newsworthy event” and “disseminated 
his film to the public,” the qualified privilege applied to Berlinger’s 
outtakes.106   
The court then had to categorize the outtakes as confidential or 
nonconfidential to determine which of the two tests applied:  the 
higher Cutler standard or the lower Gonzales standard.107  Berlinger ar-
gued that the outtakes were confidential because he had “entered into 
agreements” with some sources that he would not use “certain foot-
age” of them “without first obtaining their express authorization,” and 
because he had developed relationships of trust with other sources, 
who had an explicit or implicit understanding that the footage not 
used in the final product “would remain confidential.”108  However, 
the court was not persuaded.  In rejecting Berlinger’s arguments, it 
faulted the filmmaker for failing to identify which individual subjects 
or which, if any, outtakes were covered by alleged confidentiality 
agreements, since footage that was not subject to such agreements 
could not possibly be considered confidential.109   
Key to the court’s analysis was the finding that Berlinger’s subjects 
could not have had any expectation of confidentiality in any particular 
footage because the standard release form signed by subjects granted 
 
102 Id. at 290-93.  The court first determined that Chevron’s request met the statu-
tory requirements of § 1782.  Id. at 291; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).  The court 
then looked to the discretionary factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).  In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 291-
93.  The court concluded that “petitioners have satisfied the Intel discretionary factors.”  
Id. at 293.  
103 In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
104 Id. at 294.  
105 Id. (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
109 Id. at 294-95. 
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the filmmaker “carte blanche” to use any of the footage in the released 
film.110  The court reasoned that subjects appeared on camera for the 
purpose of having their images and words disseminated “in whatever 
film Berlinger decided to create.”111  Because “Berlinger alone re-
tained control of the content of the film,” the court determined that 
the film’s subjects could not have had a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality.112  Because the court found the outtakes to be noncon-
fidential, they were subject to the less stringent Gonzales test.113  But the 
court left the door cracked open for future filmmakers by noting that, 
although Berlinger did not present persuasive evidence of confidenti-
ality agreements, the court would have considered affidavits or other 
evidence to determine whether the filmmaker had met his burden.114 
To assess the “likely relevance” prong of the Gonzales test, the 
court considered three scenes from Crude that Chevron argued were 
“concrete evidence” that the outtakes contained “more than likely rel-
evant” footage of other improper conduct by the plaintiffs’ lawyers.115  
First, the court considered a scene in which plaintiffs’ counsel alleged-
ly participated in a “supposedly neutral” focus group conducted by an 
expert contributing to the global damages assessment report—a scene 
which was removed from the DVD version of the film at the request of 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers after Berlinger showed the film to lawyers repre-
senting both sides.116  The court stated that this conduct was “suggestive 
of an awareness of questionable activity” and supportive of Chevron’s 
argument that other “outtakes are relevant to significant issues in the 
Lago Agrio Litigation.”117  A second scene showed plaintiffs’ counsel 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 295. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (citing Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
114 Id. at 295 n.69.  For one example of a filmmaker-subject relationship that likely 
would qualify as confidential, see EXIT THROUGH THE GIFT SHOP (Paranoid Pictures 
Film Co. Ltd. 2010), which depicts the street artist Banksy without showing his face and 
having digitally altered his voice. The filmmaker’s raw footage, which might include 
shots of Banksy’s face and unaltered voice, would likely qualify for confidential protec-
tion under the district court’s test. 
115 In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 295-96. 
116 Id. at 296; see also Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger ¶ 33, In re Chevron, 709 F. 
Supp. 2d 293 (No. 19-0111), available at http://www.crudethemovie.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/Berlinger-I1.pdf (describing how Berlinger gave both sides 
an opportunity to review the film for accuracy before the theatrical release). 
117 709 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97.  Berlinger contends that the footage did not depict 
one of the neutral focus groups and that he edited the scene for narrative clarity, ra-
ther than any attempt to conceal behavior by the plaintiffs’ counsel.  Declaration of 
Joseph A. Berlinger supra note 116, ¶ 32 (“The reason I edited Dr. Beristain from the 
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requesting that a judge block an order to investigate a laboratory used 
by the plaintiffs to test soil and water samples.118  A third scene depict-
ed ex parte interactions between plaintiffs’ lawyers and government 
officials, and Chevron argued the outtakes likely depicted other at-
tempts to “curry favor” with the Government of Ecuador.119  Berlinger 
responded by claiming that Chevron’s assumptions about the outtakes 
were “entirely speculative” and that Chevron failed to particularize a 
specific portion of the footage it believed was relevant.120 
The court disagreed with Berlinger, deciding that the outtakes 
were likely relevant.121  For example, “[a]ny interaction between plain-
tiffs’ counsel and a supposedly neutral expert in the Lago Agrio Liti-
gation” would be relevant to proving or disproving the expert’s inde-
pendence and reliability.122  The court explained that the inclusion of 
excerpts of these interactions in the film “amply supports an inference 
that the outtakes contain additional relevant material,” and noted that 
the “extraordinary access” granted to Berlinger supported the as-
sumption that Berlinger’s outtakes were relevant to showing whether 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers improperly influenced witnesses and govern-
ment officials.123  Finally, the court completely rejected Berlinger’s 
particularity argument:  “[T]here is no uncertainty as to the type of 
evidence petitioners seek. . . . [Chevron] cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to identify with particularity the outtakes that they seek where 
knowledge of their content lies exclusively with Berlinger.”124 
Turning to the second prong of the Gonzales test, the court framed 
the issue as “whether there is sufficient ground to believe that the foot-
age petitioners seek would not reasonably be obtainable elsewhere.”125  
Berlinger argued first that the footage was “cumulative or duplicative 
 
Cofan meeting scene was not to ‘conceal’ any improper conduct by plaintiffs’ counsel, 
but to prevent the scene from being misconstrued and taken out of context, just as 
Chevron is attempting to do here.”). 
118 709 F. Supp. 2d at 296.  However, prior to this scene in the film, Donziger ex-
plains that it was improper for Chevron to seek the order in the first place.  CRUDE, 
supra note 2.  Chevron’s lawyer and other news media were present during the discus-
sion with the judge.  Id. 
119 709 F. Supp. 2d at 296. 
120 Id. at 296-97. 
121 Id. at 297-98. 
122 Id. at 297. 
123 Id.  The court did not explain what relevance mere access to the film’s subjects 
and the plaintiffs’ lawyers had to proving that the outtakes would be relevant to the 
litigation. 
124 Id. at 297. 
125 Id. at 298. 
ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:08 PM 
884 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 865 
of the decades-worth of scientific reports and analyses performed by 
Chevron”—an argument the court summarily rejected.126  Berlinger 
next argued that Chevron had failed to meet its burden to exhaust 
other potential sources for the evidence, noting that Chevron often had 
its own videographers present when Berlinger was filming.127  Without 
addressing whether Chevron’s own footage should narrow the scope 
of the subpoena, the court recited the Gonzales language that outtakes 
were “‘unimpeachably objective’ evidence of any misconduct.”128  
Moreover, because Berlinger was “in sole possession of the Crude out-
takes,” they could not be obtained from other sources.129  The court 
also noted that depositions were not adequate substitutes for outtake 
evidence and ordered Berlinger to turn over all of his outtakes.130 
By grounding its analysis in the characterization of Berlinger’s raw 
footage as “‘unimpeachably objective’ evidence,”131 the court effectively 
awarded special evidentiary status to outtakes.132  By the court’s logic, 
outtakes need only be sufficiently relevant to the underlying claims in 
order to pass the second prong of the Gonzales test, rendering moot 
the availability of the information from other sources.  Thus, the dis-
trict court’s opinion seems to collapse the two-pronged Gonzales test 
into a single inquiry:  whether the outtakes are likely relevant, a stand-
ard that the district court and, ultimately, the Second Circuit both 
weakened.  Although purportedly extending the Gonzales standard to 
documentary filmmakers, the district court actually diluted the test 
and pegged documentary filmmakers as second-class journalists, sub-
ject to different standards because their footage is classified as unim-
peachably objective. 
B.  The Second Circuit Affirms 
Immediately after hearing oral arguments in July 2010, the Se-
cond Circuit affirmed but narrowed the district court’s order by speci-
fying that Berlinger only needed to turn over footage depicting cer-
tain individuals.  The Second Circuit’s order compelled Berlinger to 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. (quoting Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 298-99. 
131 Id. at 298 (quoting Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36).  
132 See Tuley, supra note 83, at 1832 (arguing that “judges implicitly consider video 
evidence to be in a category all its own,” making it “more likely that outtakes will re-
ceive different treatment”). 
ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:08 PM 
2012] The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege 885 
turn over “all footage that does not appear in publicly released ver-
sions of Crude showing:  (a) counsel for the plaintiffs in the case of 
Maria Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp.; (b) private or court-appointed 
experts in that proceeding; or (c) current or former officials of the 
Government of Ecuador.”133  The Second Circuit mandated that Chev-
ron use the footage “solely for litigation, arbitration or submission to 
official bodies” and that Chevron reimburse Berlinger’s “reasonable 
expenses” of sorting and duplicating the footage.134 
Six months after oral argument, the Second Circuit issued its full 
opinion “affirm[ing] in full the district court’s ruling.”135  Without dis-
turbing any of the district court’s reasoning, Judge Leval, who also au-
thored the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gonzales,136 shifted the court’s 
focus from confidentiality to Berlinger’s status as a journalist.137  The 
court concluded that Berlinger, due to his close relationship with the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, failed to prove that he undertook the documentary 
project “with independence,” and thus he was only entitled to a weak 
journalists’ privilege, if any privilege at all.138  The court explained that 
under Second Circuit precedent, the purpose of the journalists’ privi-
lege is primarily to “protect[] . . . the public’s interest in being in-
 
133 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966 (2d Cir. July 15, 2010) (order). 
134 Id.  Berlinger complied with the subpoena, and in later legal proceedings Chev-
ron quickly convinced the court to issue additional subpoenas based on “extraordinarily 
revealing” outtakes, compelling Donziger to submit to depositions conducted by Chev-
ron lawyers.  In re Application of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); see also Barbara Leonard, Lawyer Must Comply with Chevron Subpoena, COURT-
HOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 21, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/ 
2010/10/21/31264.htm.  In subsequent proceedings, the court noted that the out-
takes contained “substantial evidence” that Donziger and others had ex parte contacts 
with the Ecuadorian court to obtain appointment of the “supposedly neutral and im-
partial” expert responsible for preparing the damages report, “secretly” worked with 
the expert prior to his appointment, and “wrote some or all of the expert’s final re-
port” submitted to the court.  In re Application of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 138-
39.  The outtakes showed Donziger stating that the Ecuadorian court was corrupt and 
the plaintiffs could “prevail only by pressuring and intimidating the courts.”  In re Ap-
plication of Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  For more dis-
cussion of the content of the outtakes and the subsequent legal proceedings, see Pat-
rick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YO`RKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38, 45-49.   
135 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2011). 
136 Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1999). 
137 See Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 300 (concluding that “Berlinger failed to carry his bur-
den of showing that he collected information for the purpose of independent reporting 
and commentary”). 
138 Id. at 309-10.  The court declined to answer the question of “whether the con-
sequence of the failure of the claimant of the privilege to establish independence 
means it has a weaker privilege or no privilege at all.”  Id. at 309. 
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formed by ‘a vigorous, aggressive and independent press.’”139  Thus, to 
qualify for the privilege, “the person must have acted in the role . . . 
identified in Baker, von Bulow, and Gonzales as that favored by the pub-
lic interest that motivates the privilege—the role of the independent 
press.”140  Further emphasizing the importance of independence, the 
court stated: 
Those who do not retain independence as to what they will publish but 
are subservient to the objectives of others who have a stake in what will be 
published have either a weaker privilege or none at all. . . . An undertak-
ing to publish matter in order to promote the interests of another, re-
gardless of justification, does not serve the same public interest, regard-
less of whether the resultant work may prove to be one of high quality.
141
 
Because Berlinger was “solicited” by Donziger to make the film, and 
because Berlinger removed one scene from the final version of the 
film at the request of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the district court reasonably denied Berlinger’s claim of 
privilege.142 
Dismissing Berlinger’s argument that Chevron failed to prove the 
relevance of the outtakes it sought, the Second Circuit concluded that 
the Gonzales test does not apply to journalists who do not demonstrate 
independence.143  The Second Circuit then concisely rejected Ber-
linger’s claim of confidentiality.  In light of the expansive release 
signed by Berlinger’s subjects and without any significant evidence of-
fered to the contrary, the district court was entitled to conclude that 
Berlinger had not met his burden as to confidentiality.144  The Second 
Circuit likewise made short work of Berlinger’s argument that the dis-
trict court’s order was overbroad.145  The court reasoned that the dis-
trict court had “greater discretion to order production of privileged 
material” based on the finding that Berlinger lacked independence, 
and it also faulted Berlinger for not providing the district court “with 
any proposal for distinguishing between relevant and assertedly non-
relevant material.”146  The district court, according to the Second Cir-
 
139 Id. at 307 (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
140 Id. at 307.  The individual seeking the privilege has the burden of proving in-
dependence.  Id. at 309. 
141 Id. at 308. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 309. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 310. 
146 Id. 
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cuit, “is not obligated to undertake this burden without help from the 
party requesting the limitation.”147 
III.  ON INDEPENDENCE AND OUTTAKES 
The Second Circuit failed to take advantage of the opportunity to 
correct the district court’s errors, and, by focusing on Berlinger’s lack 
of “independence,” misunderstood the nature of journalism and doc-
umentary film production.  The introduction of the independence re-
quirement and its application to Berlinger were misguided and may po-
tentially bar the use of the journalists’ privilege by those outside the 
institutional media, particularly documentary filmmakers.  Even for 
filmmakers who can meet the independence standard, the Second 
Circuit weakened the Gonzales test’s relevancy requirement and effec-
tively eliminated the important inquiry into alternative sources for ob-
taining the information.  Finally, the courts overstated the objectivity 
of outtakes, which will likely result in their underprotection, branding 
filmmakers as a disfavored and disadvantaged class of journalists. 
A.  Factual Confusion About Independence,  
Journalism, and Filmmaking 
The first problem with the Second Circuit’s opinion was that it in-
vented an independence requirement for the journalists’ privilege 
that was not relied upon in the district court’s opinion or found in 
other cases.  “Although the [district] court did not explicitly state a 
finding that Berlinger failed to show his independence,” the Second 
Circuit wrote, its findings that Donziger both asked Berlinger to make 
the film and successfully requested that a scene be removed from the 
DVD version “essentially assert that conclusion.”148  One reason, per-
haps, that the district court did not explicitly comment on Berlinger’s 
independence was that such a requirement had never before been 
part of the Second Circuit’s analysis.  Moreover, the district court ex-
plicitly found Berlinger to be independent.  The district court’s entire 
analysis in rejecting Berlinger’s confidentiality claim was premised on 
the findings that “Berlinger alone retained control of the content of 
the film and determined what footage would be made public”149 and 
that his subjects signed release forms granting Berlinger “carte blanche” 
 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 308.  
149 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
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to include or exclude footage as he saw fit.150  Had the district court ac-
tually concluded that Berlinger lacked editorial independence, as the 
Second Circuit suggested, the court would have needed other justifi-
cations to prove Berlinger’s sources did not have an expectation of 
confidentiality.151 
Furthermore, while the district court mentioned Donziger’s role 
in initiating the documentary project, it did not find that Donziger or 
others exerted enough editorial influence over Berlinger to negate 
Berlinger’s independence.  Rather, the district court emphasized 
Donziger’s role only to support the inference that the outtakes likely 
contained relevant evidence of improper conduct by the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.152  The court mentioned the scene deleted from the final ver-
sion only to support the conclusion “that the outtakes are relevant to 
significant issues in the Lago Agrio Litigation.”153  If one scene in the 
outtakes was known to be relevant, the court reasoned, then others 
likely were too.  But the district court never ruled that that Donziger 
compelled Berlinger to excise the deleted scene.  The Second Cir-
cuit—without citing reliable evidence that Berlinger in fact lacked in-
dependence—could not plausibly adopt the district court’s opinion 
“in full” and still reach the conclusion it did. 
The Second Circuit’s ruling implicitly set too high a bar for non-
institutional media to prove editorial and financial independence.  By 
repeatedly stating that the film had been “commissioned” or “solicit-
ed,”154 the court glossed over the fact that Donziger did not hire Ber-
linger to make the film, nor did he fund the project.155  As Crude doc-
umented, Donziger was eager to gain publicity for his case, and he 
 
150 Id. at 294-95.   
151 For a discussion of what the court might have accepted to prove confidentiality, 
see infra Sections IV.A-B. 
152 709 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 
153 Id.  
154 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 300, 302, 304-05, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2011). 
155 In a filmmaking magazine cited by the district court, Berlinger recounted that 
in his initial meeting with Donziger, he told Donziger that his observational style of 
filmmaking, which presents all sides of an argument and allows the audience to reach 
its own conclusions, opposes that of “the standard environmental and human rights 
advocacy” filmmaker.  The magazine is no longer available online but the article is re-
printed in the Crude production notes. See “Crude Realities,” by Joe Berlinger, CRUDE:  
PRODUCTION NOTES, supra note 2.  Berlinger stated that Donziger “was interested in 
my kind of storytelling, even if it meant he could not control the outcome or the mes-
sage.”  Id.  The Second Circuit mentioned Berlinger’s testimony to this effect and la-
beled it “self-serving.”  Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 308 n.5.  However, Berlinger’s article was 
published in 2009, prior to Chevron’s petition. See Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger, 
supra note 116, ¶ 25. 
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succeeded in convincing a Vanity Fair reporter to write a feature about 
the case and in recruiting Sting and Trudie Styler to champion the 
environmental cause of the Cofán nation.156  But the fact that 
Donziger brought the subject to Berlinger’s attention does not mean 
that Berlinger lacked independence.  The court’s fixation on the 
origin of the idea for the film reveals ignorance of a common journal-
istic practice for both traditional journalists and prominent documen-
tary filmmakers.157  It is not unusual for subjects or those associated 
with them to bring ideas for films to well-known filmmakers without 
demanding or obtaining any editorial control, particularly for obser-
vational documentaries.158  Because the Second Circuit took this 
common practice as evidence of Berlinger’s lack of independence—
and presumably would not find a similar lack of independence if, for 
instance, a whistleblower brought a story idea to a member of the in-
stitutional media159—the court created a scheme that treats filmmak-
ers like Berlinger as second-class journalists. 
 
156 See CRUDE, supra note 2. 
157 Subjects or their representatives bring stories to members of the institutional 
media all the time, and the Second Circuit has never before questioned the independ-
ence of those journalists based on where their story ideas originated.  Consider, for 
example, public relations professionals who actively seek media coverage for their cli-
ents, or whistleblowers who pitch stories to journalists. 
158 See, e.g., Interview with D.A. Pennebaker, Documentary Filmmaker, in New Ha-
ven, Conn. (Sept. 3, 2003) (stating that the ideas for his films come to him almost ex-
clusively from other people who approach him with topics and that thinking up ideas 
without the help of others is “a waste of time”); Interview with Ricki Stern & Annie 
Sundberg, Documentary Filmmakers, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 23, 2007) (explaining 
that the idea for the legal documentary The Trials of Darryl Hunt came from a sugges-
tion by an investigator working on the case for the defendant); see also Keith Phipps, 
Albert Maysles:  Altamont Revisited, A.V. CLUB (Oct. 18, 2000), http://www.avclub.com/ 
articles/albert-maysles,13682 (explaining that filmmakers Albert and Davis Maysles got 
the idea for the film Gimme Shelter from another filmmaker associated with the Rollins 
Stones); RICH EISEN, TOTAL ACCESS:  A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE NFL UNIVERSE 
215-16 (2007) (quoting an interview with filmmaker Steve Sabol, who said sportscaster 
Howard Cosell approached him and said, “‘You should make a film about me!’ And 
that’s what we did.”).  
159 It is common for individuals and partisan organizations to pitch stories to tradi-
tional journalists, a practice which the Second Circuit presumably would not find de-
structive of editorial independence if the journalist were employed, for example, by 
the New York Times.  Nearly every activist organization with a website has a section for 
press releases that are distributed to journalists in hopes of placing stories on the sub-
ject.  See, e.g., Press Releases, AMAZON WATCH, http://amazonwatch.org/news/press-
releases (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (publicizing various environmental causes, and 
hence story ideas, to journalists).  Yet the distribution of press releases does not mean 
that any resulting articles are automatically considered the product of the activist’s edi-
torial control.  Furthermore, beat reporters for institutional media companies operate 
within a “culture in which journalists implicitly provide positive coverage in exchange 
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The Second Circuit opinion also faulted Berlinger for removing a 
scene at the request of plaintiffs’ counsel.160  But the court, without 
explanation, dismissed Berlinger’s contention that he had an editorial 
justification for removing the scene and that he rejected other pro-
posed changes, both of which indicate that he maintained editorial 
control.161  As the Center for Social Media recently concluded in its 
report on the ethics of documentary filmmaking, it is common for 
filmmakers to give subjects the opportunity to review a cut of the film 
and make suggestions, without sacrificing their editorial independ-
ence.162  The study also noted that films can benefit from the input of 
the subjects, just as films benefit from the opinions of producers or 
other advisors who evaluate rough cuts.163  One example provided in 
 
for tidbits of news.”  Dana Milbank, Rotten to the Press Corps, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2011, 
at A15; see also Jack Shafer, Back Scratching, Washington Style, SLATE (Mar. 2, 2011, 6:16 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2287089 (describing how journalists will negotiate with 
sources, perhaps implicitly, to provide positive coverage to ensure an ongoing relation-
ship with a source).  Presumably, courts would not question the independence of pro-
fessional reporters who engage in such pervasive “back scratching.”  However the Ber-
linger decision does raise the question of whether baldly partisan news outlets, such as 
the New York Post or Fox News, could meet the independence requirement.  
160 See Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 308 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that the 
journalists’ privilege did not apply to Berlinger in large part because of the lack of in-
dependence supposedly evidenced by the deletion of the scene). 
161 See id. at 304 (noting that Berlinger rejected other changes proposed by the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs); see also supra note 117 (recounting that Berlinger maintained 
that he removed the scene for narrative clarity). 
162 See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, HONEST TRUTHS:  
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS ON ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN THEIR WORK 10-12 (2009), 
available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/Honest_Truths_--
_Documentary_Filmmakers_on_Ethical_Challenges_in_Their_Work.pdf (noting that 
while filmmakers often try to accommodate their subjects’ requests to remove footage 
if the filmmakers’ do not deem the footage to be essential to the story, most filmmak-
ers obtain releases reserving for themselves ultimate editorial control).  This is particu-
larly true of observational documentaries, as opposed to investigative documentaries 
that are composed largely of formal sit-down interviews.  Filmmakers who spend great 
lengths of time following subjects as they conduct their daily lives often form close re-
lationships with the subjects, and some believe that their subjects deserve the courtesy 
of reviewing the cut prior to distribution.  See id. (describing several filmmakers’ deci-
sions to remove or change scenes at the request of their subjects); see also Heidi Ewing 
& Rachel Grady, Directors Uncut:  Notes on One Team’s Process, DOCUMENTARY, Fall 2011, 
at 22, 26 (“When our docs are nearly finished, we screen the work for [our subjects].  
This private viewing is not an invitation for editorial changes but a respectful gesture 
that fosters a frank discussion about the decisions we made in the edit.  Here, griev-
ances can be aired and any factual errors remedied before the film flies out of our 
hands and into the world at large.”); CINEMANIA (Wellspring Media 2002) (ending the 
documentary film with a scene of the film’s subjects, itinerate movie-goers, watching a 
near-final cut of the film about themselves and reacting to their depictions).  
163 See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 11.  
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the study was that of filmmaker Ross Kauffman, director of the Acad-
emy Award-winning Born into Brothels,164 who removed a “coda” from 
one of his films because the subjects maintained that the scene did not 
“ring true” to who they were.165  Kauffman agreed and removed the 
coda from the film, remarking, “They were much happier, I was much 
happier, and the film was better because of it.”166  In other words, 
Kauffman was simply persuaded by his subjects’ argument; his deci-
sion to remove the scene was in no way compelled by his subjects’ edi-
torial control of the film. 
The Berlinger decision discourages filmmakers from accepting ad-
vice from subjects, even if making the changes would improve the 
film’s clarity or accuracy.167  The presumption that accepting subjects’ 
advice suggests a lack of independence raises unique ethical questions 
for documentary filmmakers.  Filmmakers often form close, trust-
based relationships with subjects during the intense and intimate film-
 
164 Ross Kauffman, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm1502104 (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011).  
165 AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 11.  A coda is a short scene that appears 
after the closing credits of a film.   
166 Id. 
167 Removing a scene is similar to the common journalistic practice of correcting or 
contextualizing a quotation after sending the quotation to the source for review, which, 
again, would be unlikely to destroy independence in the eyes of the court if practiced 
by a member of the institutional press.  Journalists working on tight deadlines often do 
not have the luxury of permitting sources to review quotations for inaccuracies.  How-
ever, when time permits, the practice is allowed and is not uncommon.  See, e.g., Hand-
book of Journalism:  Independence, REUTERS, http://handbook.reuters.com/index.php 
/independence (last updated Sept. 21, 2009) (allowing reporters to verify quotes and 
information with sources, but warning against being unduly influenced by subjects).  
Many organizations do not expressly allow subjects to review an article prior to publica-
tion, although they recognize that pieces are often created in a spirit of collaboration.  See 
Guidance:  Access Agreements and Indemnity Forms, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/ 
editorialguidelines/page/guidance-access-agreements-summary (last updated Oct. 2010) 
(noting that collaboration between journalists and subjects often happens in practice, 
but that formal legal agreements that could compromise editorial integrity should be 
avoided).  The Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics directs journalists to 
“act independently” of any obligation or interest “other than the public’s right to 
know.”  See Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/pdf/ 
ethicscode.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).  But the Code cannot be taken to mean that 
filmmakers are prohibited from excising any scene that is included in a rough cut of a 
film.  Although the district court was suspicious of Berlinger’s motivation for removing 
the scene, Berlinger also had a plausible editorial explanation—narrative clarity—for 
cutting the scene.  See supra note 117.  It is also worth noting that the deleted scene is 
still included in the version of the film available for streaming on Netflix, and thus was 
not entirely removed from public viewing.  See Crude, NETFLIX, http://www.netflix.com/ 
Movie/Crude/70112742 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (allowing Netflix subscribers to 
watch this version of Crude instantly). 
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ing process, and believe that subjects have a right to review the film 
prior to distribution because the subjects are the ones who must live 
with the consequences that result from the public dissemination of 
the intimate details of their lives.168  Filmmaker Gordon Quinn,169 who 
requires his subjects to sign releases acknowledging that they will not 
have any legal control over the final cut, nonetheless tells subjects:  
“We will show [you] the film before it is finished.  I want you to sign 
the release, but we will really listen to you.  But ultimately it has to be 
our decision.”170  Quinn’s statement recognizes that the documentary 
film medium, due to its immediacy and vivid depictions of reality, car-
ries with it special ethical obligations.  Quinn’s solution is to reserve 
his legal rights to editorial control but remain sympathetic to the 
opinions and feelings of his subjects until those opinions and feelings 
begin to interfere with his editorial convictions.  The fact that a 
filmmaker faces different ethical obligations than print journalists 
should not make him any less able to invoke the journalists’ privilege 
than are “lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, 
and dramatists,” all of whom qualify for protection under von Bulow.171 
In Berlinger, the Second Circuit focused on the different ethical 
obligations and professional practices of filmmakers and traditional 
institutional journalists to derive an independence requirement that 
disadvantages filmmakers more than other journalists.  The applica-
tion of the independence requirement in Berlinger discounts the value 
of the contributions documentarians make to the public debate, and, 
in the name of respecting the underlying principles of the journalists’ 
privilege, frustrates the purposes of the privilege itself.  A better ap-
 
168 See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 10-11.  In many ways, a documentary 
film, particularly an observational film, represents a more intimate and often more re-
vealing portrait than a print media profile because the film depicts actual images and 
sounds of the subject.  Some documentarians believe that this heightened intimacy trig-
gers ethical considerations not present in the print journalist–subject relationship.  See, 
e.g., Interview by John Ellis with Roger Graef, Documentary Filmmaker, in Phila., Pa. 
(Feb. 25, 2011) (discussing how Graef pulled a documentary from BBC prior to broad-
cast because of objections by the family of a child depicted in the film, based not on 
legal but ethical considerations).  
169 Gordon Quinn is the artistic director and co-founder of Kartemquin Films.  
Gordon Quinn, KARTEMQUIN FILMS, http://kartemquin.com/about/gordon-quinn (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2011).  Kartemquin is a Chicago-based production company known for 
its award-winning documentaries Hoop Dreams, The Interrupters, At the Death House Door, 
and Stevie.  Films, KARTEMQUIN FILMS http://www.kartemquin.com/films (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011). 
170 AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 10. 
171 Von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972)).  
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proach would be for courts to accept how technology has altered the 
practice of journalism and construct a test that does not discriminate 
against new technological forms.  A film detailing the environmental 
impact of decades of oil production deserves as much protection as an 
article on the same subject, and courts should not justify interfering 
with the journalistic function of documentary filmmakers on the basis 
of differing best practices and ethical considerations. 
B.  Fishing for Precedent 
The language of the Second Circuit’s decision in Berlinger belied 
the scarcity of precedent for the new independence requirement and 
severed the word “independent” from its accepted meaning in the 
context of the press.  Applying the von Bulow test, the district court 
had “assume[d]” that the privilege applied to Berlinger as a filmmaker 
because he investigated a newsworthy event with the intent to dissem-
inate his film to the public.172  But the Second Circuit read von Bulow 
to contain an additional requirement:  “[W]e spoke of the interest be-
ing protected as the public’s interest in being informed by ‘a vigorous, 
aggressive and independent press.’”173  Although independence was nev-
er central to the holding in von Bulow, nor cited as a required element 
by subsequent circuits adopting or referencing the test,174 in Berlinger 
the Second Circuit implied von Bulow held independence as an essen-
tial element of the test for the journalists’ privilege.  When discussing 
Gonzales, the court admitted that independence was not a factor in 
that case but, without citing textual support, similarly asserted that 
“our discussion assumed that the press entity was acting with inde-
pendence.”175  In fact, Gonzales itself summarized von Bulow without 
reference to independence:  “In von Bulow v. von Bulow we stated that 
 
172 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
173 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting von Bu-
low, 811 F.2d at 144). 
174 See, e.g., Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) (de-
scribing the von Bulow test as inquiring whether the claimant seeking protection “in-
tended ‘at the inception of the newsgathering process’ to use the fruits of his research 
‘to disseminate information to the public’” (quoting von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144)); Ti-
tan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125, 129-30 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (adopting the von Bulow test without mention of an independence require-
ment and remarking that a person may invoke the privilege if his or her purpose is 
“gathering news for publication”); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 
1993) (adopting the von Bulow test in the case of an investigative book author without 
mention of independence and stating that “[w]hat makes journalism journalism is . . . 
its content”). 
175 Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 309. 
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so long as an entity gathers information with ‘intent to disseminate to 
the public,’ it may avail itself of the journalists’ privilege . . . .”176 
The Second Circuit’s only authority for its new concept of “inde-
pendence” was a snippet of a single sentence from its 1992 decision in 
Baker v. F & F Investment, later quoted in Gonzales177 and von Bulow,178 
which described the justification for the creation of journalist shield 
laws in New York and Illinois.179  Those laws, the Baker court wrote, “re-
flect a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, 
aggressive and independent press capable of participating in robust, 
unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest which has 
always been a principal concern of the First Amendment.”180  When 
courts and commentators discuss the “independence” of the press, 
they overwhelmingly use the term in reference to freedom from gov-
ernment control or obstruction of journalism by some other authority 
with censorship power—not to describe a journalist’s freedom from 
influence by a subject.181  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, cited by 
 
176 Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting von 
Bulow, 811 F.2d at 143). 
177 194 F.3d at 33. 
178 811 F.2d at 144. 
179 Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972).  
180 Id.  Interestingly, New York’s own shield law defines a “professional journalist” 
without any reference to independence from subjects:  a professional journalist is “one 
who . . . is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping 
or photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency . . . or 
other professional medium or agency which has as one of its regular functions the 
processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the public.”  N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6)(McKinney 2010). 
181 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 129 n.4 (1982) (White, 
J., dissenting) (recounting one of the respondent’s arguments that “[t]here is no such 
thing as a free and independent press within the union” when the incumbent officers 
governing the organization also control the union newspaper (emphasis added)); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (reciting past 
governmental attempts to regulate the press and concluding “there is obviously a con-
tinuing need for an independent press” to, among other things, expose corruption and 
keep the public informed (emphasis added)); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953) (“By interpreting to the citizen the policies of his gov-
ernment and vigilantly scrutinizing the official conduct of those who administer the 
state, an independent press stimulates free discussion and focuses public opinion on is-
sues and officials as a potent check on arbitrary action or abuse.” (emphasis added)); 
United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000) (asserting that a judicial or-
der to reveal a confidential source sought by the prosecutor would threaten the public 
interest in an independent press); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 988 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(“To the extent that the independent exercise of editorial functions is threatened by gov-
ernmental action, the very foundations of the architectural masterpiece that is our form 
of government are shaken . . . .” (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds, 441 U.S. 153 
(1979); Sikelianos v. City of New York, No. 05-7673, 2008 WL 2465120, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
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Baker, the Supreme Court, discussing the press and freedom of speech 
expressed concern about the government “placing . . . a handicap up-
on the freedoms of expression,”182 and praised the “unfettered inter-
change of ideas”183 and “free political discussion” as “essential to the 
security of the Republic.”184  These notions of encouraging a market-
place of ideas and facilitating self-governance with a well-informed 
public—two oft-cited theoretical justifications for the freedoms of 
speech and the press185—thus inform the Baker court’s use of the word 
“independent” and underscore the misreading by the Second Circuit 
in Berlinger.186 
The Second Circuit did not explain how courts should assess in-
dependence, but the court offered “an illustrative example.”187  Imag-
ine, the court instructed, two individuals, Smith and Jones, both inves-
 
June 18, 2008) (stating that granting “unfettered access to ‘sift through [journalists’] 
files’ . . . would undermine the public’s perception of the press as an independent institu-
tion and foster the view that it is ‘an investigative arm of the judicial system, the govern-
ment, or private parties’” (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36)); Ofosu 
v. McElroy, 933 F. Supp. 237, 240 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he opposition press re-
mains vigorous and unrestrained by the government . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); United Food & Commercial Workers Local 919 v. Ottaway 
Newspapers, Inc., No. 90-0592, 1991 WL 328466, at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 12, 1991) (not-
ing that the “function of the press . . . has never been conceived as anything but a pri-
vate enterprise, free and independent of government control and supervision” (emphasis 
added)).   
 A number of other judicial voices concur that independence of the press refers to 
the media’s relationship with the government.  See David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the 
Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 232-34 (describing the historical practice 
of official licensing of the press and concluding that such a practice precluded the pos-
sibility of an independent press); Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 
634 (1975) (discussing the origins of the First Amendment and asserting the “primary 
purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . to create a fourth insti-
tution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official branches”). 
182 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
183 Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
184 Id.  (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).  
185 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-15, 493-95 (3d ed. 
2008) (collecting various scholars’ justifications for the freedoms of speech and the 
press, including several noting the democracy-reinforcing effect of the free exchange 
of ideas and the dangers inherent in government manipulation of information dissem-
inated to the public). 
186 Rather than speaking of independence, perhaps a more textually sound ap-
proach for the Second Circuit would be to conclude that, because Berlinger was subject 
to influences by his sources, he was not engaged in activities “traditionally associated 
with the gathering and dissemination of news.”  Von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 
142 (2d Cir. 1987).  The court then could have stated that objectivity, rather than inde-
pendence, was a prerequisite for claiming protection.  For a discussion of why even this 
argument would be descriptively questionable, see supra note 159 and infra note 198. 
187 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2011).  
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tigating and writing about a public official.188  Smith is entitled to 
stronger protections if she undertakes the project “to discover whatever 
she can through her investigations and to write a book that reflects 
whatever her investigations may show.”189  Jones, by contrast, has been 
“hired or commissioned to write a book extolling [the public official’s] 
virtues and rebutting his critics,” and promoting “a particular point of 
view regardless of what her investigations may reveal.”190  The court 
concluded that Jones is entitled to little or no protection.191  The 
court’s hypothetical suggests that even if Smith and Jones engaged in 
identical research techniques and produced identical books, Jones 
would receive less protection merely due to the source of her paycheck 
or her mindset while writing the book.  The court provided no expla-
nation why a person’s employer, mindset, or professional associations 
should be relevant to determining the applicability or strength of the 
journalists’ privilege, which was designed to safeguard the free flow of 
information from sources to news gatherers to the public. 
The implication of the hypothetical is not encouraging for jour-
nalists outside of the institutional media.  The court seemed to con-
clude that Berlinger was a Jones rather than a Smith, when in fact 
there was no evidence at all that Berlinger was hired to advocate a par-
ticular point of view or that he was subject to the editorial control of 
Donziger or others.192  If the Second Circuit’s test was designed to 
weaken or eliminate the privilege for filmmakers who were commis-
sioned by subjects to present a biased film and who ceded editorial 
control to those subjects, then the court was fashioning a solution to a 
problem that, in Berlinger’s case, did not exist. 193 
 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 I submit that the Jones-type character is capable of producing an objective work 
of journalism even if she has a particular agenda in mind during her investigation.  At 
the very least, the hypothetical should recognize a third character, representing a mid-
dle ground.  Such a character can set out to create a film or article at the suggestion of a 
subject and incorporate the subject’s ideas without sacrificing editorial objectivity. 
193 The court's independence requirement seems tailored to much more baldly 
partisan filmmaking than that practiced by Berlinger.  Perhaps in writing the opinion, 
Judge Leval was more concerned about political films such as Hillary:  The Movie, which 
was the subject of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), 
or—although it would not be created until the 2012 presidential Republican prima-
ry—When Mitt Romney Came to Town, a 28-minute “documentary-style attack film” made 
by a “Republican operative” and broadcast in South Carolina using funds from a “pro-
[Newt] Gingrich super PAC.”  See David Carr, Hollywood Techniques at Play in Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012, at B1.  Focusing more explicitly on the funding sources for 
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Furthermore, the court placed the burden of proving independ-
ence on the person claiming the privilege.194  If Berlinger was unable 
to pass the independence test, it is unclear how many other documen-
tarians would be able to meet this burden.  The Second Circuit’s deci-
sion implies that complete financial independence,195 signed releases 
by subjects waiving rights to editorial control,196 and declarations that 
the filmmaker rejected editorial suggestions by the subject are all insuf-
ficient to prove independence.197  Likewise, independence cannot be 
inferred by the inclusion of material that shows the subject in an unfa-
vorable light.198  Presumably, a documentary filmmaker who develops 
an idea for a film without any suggestion from her subjects, and who 
denies those subjects the opportunity to review or comment on the 
film prior to release, would pass the Berlinger test.199  But denying the 
privilege to filmmakers on the basis of where an idea originated or 
upon whose final cut advice the filmmaker accepts uncouples the test 
from the core purpose that the privilege was designed to protect—the 
unfettered flow of newsworthy information to the public. 
Other courts have declined to probe into an individual’s motivation 
for gathering information beyond what von Bulow requires.  These 
courts recognize that assessing the origins and motivations of a jour-
nalistic work is perilous, as is distinguishing between scrupulous jour-
nalism and advocacy.  For example, one California appellate court 
 
films, however, might be a better, if imperfect, way to distinguish paid propaganda 
from films like Crude. 
194 Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 309. 
195 There was never any assertion that Donziger or the other plaintiffs’ lawyers 
bankrolled Berlinger’s film. 
196 See In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d. 283, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (describing the release forms Berlinger had his subjects sign). 
197 See Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger, supra note 116, ¶ 33 (testifying that Ber-
linger rejected all but one editorial suggestion made by the plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
198 See id. ¶ 32 (arguing that including scenes depicting Donziger’s “questionable 
conduct” is evidence of Berlinger’s commitment “to creating an unbiased” portrait “of 
the people and events surrounding the Lago Argio Litigation”); see also CRUDE, supra 
note 2 (depicting questionable interactions between Donziger and a judge and other 
government officials); supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
199 Berlinger’s independence test might even disqualify institutionalized journalists.  
A journalist using leaked information from a confidential source might be said to lack 
independence if the journalist knows that the publication of such information will 
serve the source’s personal or political goals.  A reporter for Fox News, for instance, 
also might be denied the privilege if she fashions a piece to serve the objectives of a 
conservative politician featured in a television report.  The court did not define objec-
tivity for these purposes, nor did it explain how to characterize the interests of subjects 
and journalists. 
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stated as much in a case about website operators who posted infor-
mation about forthcoming Apple products: 
 We decline the implicit invitation to embroil ourselves in questions of 
what constitutes “legitimate journalis[m].”  The shield law is intended to 
protect the gathering and dissemination of news, and that is what peti-
tioners did here.  We can think of no workable test or principle that 
would distinguish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” news.  Any attempt by 
courts to draw such a distinction would imperil a fundamental purpose 
of the First Amendment, which is to identify the best, most important, 
and most valuable ideas not by any sociological or economic formula, 
rule of law, or process of government, but through the rough and tum-
ble competition of the memetic marketplace.
200
 
C.  Overbroad Orders and Weakening the Relevance Requirement 
Perhaps just as critical for documentary filmmakers, the Second 
Circuit failed to correct the flaws in the district court’s reasoning and 
left intact assertions and findings that may lead future courts astray 
when considering outtakes.  By treating outtakes differently from oth-
er evidence, the district court misapplied the Gonzales test and thereby 
weakened the journalists’ privilege for documentary filmmakers.  The 
Second Circuit made this misstep in spite of the fact that the district 
court assumed that the qualified privilege applied. 
First, the order to turn over all six-hundred hours of outtakes was 
overbroad on its face.  The district court found that “[a]ny interac-
tion” between the lawyers and experts, implicitly including interac-
tions with members of the judiciary or other government agents, 
“would be relevant.”201  But the court did not limit the subpoena to 
footage depicting interactions between the lawyers and relevant offi-
cials, nor did it limit the subpoena to footage containing the lawyers 
whose behavior Chevron sought to discredit.202  Chevron made no 
showing and the court provided no explanation in ruling that footage 
of other individuals (for example, members of the Cofán nation) 
would be “likely relevant” to proving anything regarding the conduct 
of the plaintiffs’ lawyers.203  Thus, the district court’s order lowered the 
relevancy standard under Gonzales. 
 
200 O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 97 (Ct. App. 2006) (alteration in 
original). 
201 In re Chevron, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 
202 See id. at 299 (ordering that Berlinger turn over “the raw footage” of Crude). 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 115-23 (tracing the district court’s applica-
tion of the “likely relevant” standard to scenes in Crude). 
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In a minor victory for Berlinger, the Second Circuit temporarily 
narrowed the order by limiting discovery to footage that depicted cer-
tain key individuals.204  Because the Second Circuit did not limit its or-
der to footage of the interactions of the lawyers with the experts or 
other officials, or to footage of those individuals describing or strate-
gizing about their interactions, the order still netted about eighty-five 
percent of Berlinger’s footage, approximately five-hundred hours.205  
The Second Circuit, transforming Gonzales, sanctioned the use of a 
lower standard of relevance for outtakes, because the order captured 
any footage of any of the listed individuals, including footage with no 
possible relevance to the issue of improper conduct on the part of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.206  For instance, any footage of Donziger coaching a 
member of the Cofán nation in preparation for a press conference 
was discoverable under the Second Circuit’s order.  Acknowledging 
that its order would compel discovery of irrelevant material, the Se-
cond Circuit turned a Gonzales mandate into an aspiration:  “While in 
general it is desirable for a district court to tailor a production order to 
material likely to be relevant, the district court lacked any reliable means 
of doing so.”207  In other words, because Chevron could not articulate 
the specific behavior of which they sought evidence, they were re-
warded with access to all of the footage.208  This reasoning severely 
lowered, if not completely obliterated, the bar for relevance under 
 
204 See Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966 (2d Cir. July 15, 2010) 
(order) (narrowing the required disclosure to footage involving counsel, experts, or 
government officials). 
205 Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, Documentary Filmmaker (Nov. 12, 
2010).  
206 The Second Circuit claimed that the Gonzales test did not apply to Berlinger.  
See Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 309 (2d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Gonza-
les on the ground that independence was not an issue in that case).  But by affirming 
the district court’s opinion “in full,” id. at 311, the court arguably validated the district 
court’s analysis of the test.  It is unclear what precedential effect Chevron v. Berlinger will 
have on Gonzales. 
207 Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
208 The Second Circuit order reflected a lack of understanding about the technol-
ogy of film outtakes too.  And in reality the scope of the Second Circuit’s order was not 
even as loosely tailored as it seemed.  Berlinger had just two-and-a-half weeks to turn 
over the footage, not even enough time to review the six-hundred hours of footage to 
pull out the relevant five-hundred hours.  Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, 
supra note 205.  As a result, Berlinger “threw in the towel” and turned over more foot-
age than necessary, including irrelevant footage, in order to comply with the deadline 
set in the order.  Id.  A more narrowly tailored order likely would have required even 
more time to comply.  As a policy matter, the time-consuming nature of reviewing and 
duplicating footage should be taken into account when fashioning discovery order 
deadlines. 
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Gonzales and created an incentive for parties to phrase discovery re-
quests broadly.209  Gonzales itself warned that litigants should not be al-
lowed “to sift through press files in search of information supporting 
their claims,” because such disclosure “would burden the press with 
heavy costs of subpoena compliance,” impair its ability to perform its 
duties, and bestow upon it the appearance of being “an investigative 
arm of the judicial system.”210  At best, the scenes in the final cut of 
Crude indicate the possible relevance of outtakes, a showing that would 
have been insufficient to compel discovery in the past. 
Next, the district court ruled that Chevron had met its burden to 
show that the evidence in the outtakes was not available from other 
sources because Berlinger had been granted “almost unprecedented 
access” to the plaintiffs’ attorneys and “[t]he raw footage he compiled 
would be ‘unimpeachably objective’ evidence of any misconduct on 
the part of the plaintiffs’ counsel, expert witnesses, or the [Govern-
 
209 In all other previous cases, outtakes were much more clearly relevant to known 
events or material already in the record.  For instance, in United States v. Cutler, a crim-
inal case, outtakes of an interview with a lawyer were deemed directly relevant because 
the underlying suit concerned whether the lawyer violated an order not to discuss cer-
tain topics with the media; so the process of filming was potentially the crime itself.  6 
F.3d 67, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1993).  In Gonzales v. NBC, petitioners sought footage to contex-
tualize an event known to have taken place—the traffic stop of the NBC reporter—as 
evidence of a pattern of behavior by the defendant police officer.  194 F.3d 29, 30-31, 
36-37 (2d Cir. 1999).   
 Even the First Circuit case of United States v. LaRouche Campaign, which granted 
perhaps the most speculative discovery of outtakes of any federal court, was directly 
relevant to testimony already given in court.  841 F.2d 1176, 1179 (1st Cir. 1988). This 
appeal arose out of a “pretrial ruling enforcing a subpoena of a third-party witness in 
connection with a pending criminal prosecution” of Lyndon LaRouche, a presidential 
candidate in 1984.  Id. at 1177.  The district court ordered NBC to submit outtakes of 
an interview with Forrest Lee Fick, a consultant to the LaRouche campaign.  Id.  The 
interview allegedly included statements that contradicted testimony Fick gave in the 
trial of Roy Frankhauser, another consultant to the campaign.  Id.  Frankhauser was 
convicted of obstruction of justice relating to his efforts to prevent a grand jury from 
gathering evidence on mail and wire fraud counts.  Id.  On appeal, the First Circuit 
held that outtakes from a 100-minute television interview with Fick, a key witness in 
LaRouche’s pending criminal case, of which only one minute aired, “likely covered a 
wide range of subject matter” and might show bias or reveal statements inconsistent 
with his previous trial testimony.  Id. at 1177, 1179-80.  Chevron, by contrast, was not 
looking to establish a general practice or pattern by the lawyers, nor to impeach testi-
mony already in the record of a companion case, but rather was looking for evidence 
of specific improper conduct uncorroborated by other evidence.  This fact is particu-
larly confounding because of the ample evidence that Chevron obtained through other 
§ 1782 motions alleging misconduct by the lawyers.  See infra notes 214-15 and accom-
panying text. 
210 Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35. 
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ment of Ecuador].”211  While the district court’s description of Ber-
linger’s access was accurate, such access alone does not indicate that 
no other evidence of wrongdoing was available.212  The Second Circuit 
explicitly made this observation in 1996:  “[I]t cannot be said that per-
tinent material is not obtainable elsewhere just because it is included 
in some out-takes.”213 
Chevron’s § 1782 actions in other jurisdictions make the unavaila-
bility claim even less plausible.  Although Berlinger did not raise and 
the district court did not consider these other motions, Chevron 
brought § 1782 actions in more than a dozen U.S. jurisdictions to ob-
tain evidence of misconduct by plaintiffs’ lawyers, and each motion 
yielded at least some discovery.214  Chevron’s efforts, beginning in 
2009, uncovered thousands of documents that would establish a prima 
facie case that Donziger and others associated with the plaintiffs 
“ghostwrote” the Lago Agrio damages report.215  Had Chevron ad-
duced some of this independent evidence suggesting specific behavior 
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys during Berlinger’s filming, the district court 
could have soundly concluded that the footage was “likely relevant” to 
Chevron’s defense, but it also might have concluded that evidence of 
the lawyers’ misconduct was available from these other sources.  In 
light of this evidence, the district court appears to have guessed cor-
rectly that the outtakes contained evidence of misconduct.  But, by al-
lowing Chevron to subpoena Berlinger’s footage without having to 
first produce any of the evidence, the court baited the hooks for fu-
ture fishing expeditions the likes of which courts have decried.216  
 
211 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
212 For instance, the court ignored Berlinger’s claim that Chevron’s attorneys of-
ten had their own cameras capturing the same events witnessed by Berlinger and his 
crew—a potential alternate source of evidence.  Id. 
213 Krase v. Graco Children Prods., Inc. (In re Application to Quash Subpoenas to 
NBC), 79 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 1996). 
214 See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 783 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (refer-
ring to Chevron’s § 1782 proceedings throughout the country). 
215 In re Application of Chevron Corp., Nos. 10-0208, 10-0209, 2010 WL 5173279, at 
*9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 276 (3d. Cir. 2011); see also 
Roger Parloff, Evidence of Fraud Mounts in Ecuadorian Suit Against Chevron, CNN MONEY 
(Sept. 13, 2010, 10:43 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/13/news/international/ 
chevron_ecuador_litigation.fortune/index.htm (discussing the breadth of documents 
available to Chevron and testimony on the issue of misconduct by the lawyers). 
216 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 
667, 669, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (suggesting that “such a request to compel disclosure of 
media files for this sort of fishing expedition should not lightly be granted” and that a 
motion “at most based on a hypothesis or ‘hunch,’ lacking a logical basis” is “insuffi-
cient” to show relevance).  
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Chevron’s actual showing in this case should have failed either the 
“likely relevant” prong or the unavailability prong of the Gonzales 
test.217 
What remains of the Gonzales test, then, is one basic inquiry:  
whether the outtakes are “likely relevant” to the proceeding.  In the 
realm of documentary filmmaking, the court effectively abandoned 
any meaningful inquiry into alternate sources of evidence prior to 
compelling discovery of journalistic work product and also lowered 
the standard for relevance by granting such a broad order.  Protection 
for nonconfidential information, at least for documentary filmmakers, 
has been dealt a serious blow by the Berlinger cases. 
D.  Impeachable Outtakes 
The district court opinion further reveals a lack of conceptual 
clarity about the nature of outtakes which, if uncorrected, could lead 
future courts to treat outtakes differently from other types of evidence 
without adequate justification.  Using language that posits outtakes as 
“unimpeachably objective” encourages judges and jurors to place un-
deserved trust in photographic evidence, which will lead to its under-
protection.  Courts that embrace this exceptionalism of outtakes al-
most always compel discovery.218  But if courts better understood the 
filmmaking process and the influence that the act of filming has on 
subjects and conducted a more searching analysis of what outtakes do 
or do not contain, they would conclude that outtakes should be treated 
with as critical an eye as any other kind of evidence.  Although it is 
tempting to view outtakes as an unbiased record of events, outtakes 
are in fact far more subjective and incomplete than courts recognize. 
The district court’s language in the Berlinger case occasionally failed 
to distinguish the physical film, videotape, or digital file (the “out-
takes”) from the information contained within the outtakes.  The dis-
trict court framed one issue as “whether there is sufficient ground to 
 
217 See Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999).   
218 See Tuley, supra note 83, at 1825-32 (arguing that this view of outtakes leads to 
less stringent applications of discovery standards and makes it more likely that outtakes 
will receive different treatment as compared to other evidence); see also United States v. 
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that a subpoena for 
outtakes was appropriate, in part because “[n]o other source (by definition) [was] 
available”); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing 
outtakes as “[b]y their very nature . . . not obtainable from any other source” because 
“[t]hey are unique bits of evidence that are frozen at a particular place and time”); 
United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing outtakes 
as demonstrating “with extraordinary clarity” behavior by government agents).  
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believe that the footage petitioners seek would not reasonably be ob-
tainable elsewhere,”219 while the proper inquiry should have been 
whether the information contained within the outtakes was obtainable 
elsewhere.  Even when the district court properly distinguished out-
takes from their content, the court conflated the outtakes with the 
underlying allegations that petitioners sought to prove:  “Petitioners 
cannot reasonably be expected to identify with particularity the out-
takes that they seek where knowledge of their content lies exclusively 
with Berlinger.”220  The court’s statement here seems to suggest that 
Chevron could not articulate what conduct it sought to prove without 
knowing what the outtakes depicted.  This confusion—which posits 
outtakes as unique evidence either inseparable from their content or 
from the underlying allegations of wrongdoing—leaves a textual trail 
that could lead future courts to apply the Gonzales test improperly and 
thus carelessly underprotect outtakes. 
To be sure, film and video footage enjoys a nexus to reality that 
distinguishes them from other kinds of evidence and “differing treat-
ment based on the intrinsic nature of the medium is not necessarily 
offensive.”221  But the way the Second Circuit has distinguished out-
takes from other kinds of evidence—describing footage as “unim-
peachably objective evidence”222—represents a simplistic and prob-
lematic view of the video medium and encourages courts to hold 
outtakes to a different standard than other kinds of evidence.  This 
unquestioned belief in the objectivity of video evidence may lead 
judges and jurors to erroneous conclusions. 
While it is tempting to view photographs and video as objective ev-
idence—indeed, photographic records do document exactly what was 
in front of the camera at the time of recording—it is nonetheless intu-
itive to treat outtake evidence critically, rather than as “unimpeacha-
bly objective.”  One common criticism of observational documentary 
filmmaking—of which Berlinger is, to a degree, a practitioner—is that 
the premise that filmmakers can observe what is being recorded with-
out influencing the events and the subjects of the camera’s gaze is a 
fallacy.  This observational impact should cause us to question the very 
 
219 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
220 Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
221 Tuley, supra note 83, at 1833. 
222 Gonzales  194 F.3d at 36.   
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truth of what the films purport to capture.223  In 1985, the Southern 
District of New York warned that the evidentiary value of statements 
depends on the context in which they are made: 
[H]abitues of saloons and guests at talk shows are usually not placed un-
der oath, and in both cases temptations are great for exaggeration and 
for the speaker placing himself in the most favorable light. The resulting 
information in each case is likely to be of little or no evidentiary value in 
court.
224
 
Courts should treat documentary footage—particularly outtakes—with 
the same skepticism.  During the production of any documentary, 
filmmakers inevitably will find a subject altering his behavior for the 
benefit of the camera,225 perhaps making contrived statements to ap-
pear how he wishes to be viewed or self-consciously attempting to por-
tray himself in the most favorable light.  It is the job of the filmmaker, 
during the editing process, to recognize which moments seem genu-
ine and minimize the use of those that seem contrived for the camera 
in the final film.226  If the judgment of the filmmaker is to be trusted, 
there may be more reason to doubt the authenticity of statements and 
behavior in outtakes than those in the final cut of the film.227 
Another widely accepted truism about documentary filmmaking is 
that the editing process introduces manipulation and bias in the film’s 
 
223 See, e.g., WILLIAM ROTHMAN, Alfred Guzzetti’s Family Portrait Sittings (“We can-
not take for granted the authenticity of what is in the frame, because our means of ac-
cess to it may be deeply implicated in its appearance.”), in THE “I” OF THE CAMERA:  
ESSAYS IN FILM CRITICISM, HISTORY, AND AESTHETICS 304, 305 (2d ed. 2004). 
224 United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 667, 
671 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
225 See BARRY HAMPE, MAKING DOCUMENTARY FILMS AND REALITY VIDEOS 41-42 
(1997) (observing that since “[w]e expect people to act differently in different situa-
tions . . . it is not surprising if people alter their behavior in front of a documentary 
crew and camera,” but because “[m]ost people just aren’t very good actors[,] . . . if 
they start out playing a role, they’ll soon fall back on their normal pattern of behavior” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
226 See, e.g., id. at 296 (recommending that filmmakers discard footage “in which 
someone was mugging at the camera” as well as other footage that implies something 
untrue or unfair); Interview by John Ellis with Roger Graef, supra note 168 (discussing 
the practice of stopping filming or editing out moments when subjects directly address 
or “mug” for the camera).  
227 Filmmakers may choose to discard footage for any number of reasons, includ-
ing if a subject is acting for the benefit of the camera, if the footage gives the wrong 
impression without proper context, or if the outtakes needlessly confuse the simplified 
narrative that the filmmaker constructs while editing hundreds of hours of footage 
down to a final cut.  Filmmakers who hold themselves to certain journalistic and 
filmmaking standards of professional behavior and ethics, by behaving in accordance 
with documentary norms, stand to be harmed the most by the Berlinger rulings.  
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presentation of reality.228  But the same could be said of the mental 
“editing” process that occurs when the filmmaker initially chooses 
when, where, and what to record.  Just as a film presents only a por-
tion of the captured footage, outtakes capture only a portion of real 
events—the portion the camera recorded—and courts must be careful 
not to assume too much about what has and has not been recorded.  
The real-time nature of documentary film production ensures that 
filmmakers will miss capturing some key moments or statements.  
Outtakes may include a statement without capturing the subject’s ca-
veat about what he intended to say or a damaging assertion without 
the subject’s later recantation.  Outtakes may not fully represent the 
context of certain statements, thus failing to alert uncritical viewers 
that, for example, a statement was made in jest.  The very phrase “un-
impeachably objective evidence” discourages viewers from thinking 
critically about what outtakes do and do not show and invites a lower 
level of scrutiny than is applied to other testimonial evidence.  
Filmmakers should have the opportunity to raise these issues, and 
judges should be open to the idea that outtakes are less reliable than 
they may initially appear. 
Professor Jessica Silbey has argued forcefully that photographs 
and other visual documentary evidence should be subject to the criti-
cal analysis applied to all other evidence.229  Drawing from film theory 
and semiotics,230 Silbey and others generally conclude that the audience 
“provide[s] the photograph’s meaning; its significance does not origi-
nate from the photograph’s referentiality but from what we currently 
use it for in our world.”231  Those who recognize the limitations of 
photographic evidence do not claim that photographs are inherently 
unreliable, but they do acknowledge that photographs and video evi-
dence can “attract false beliefs” and “make us think we know more 
 
228 See, e.g., Barry Keith Grant, Truth or Dare:  Theoretical and Ethical Considerations, 
FILM REFERENCE, http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Criticism-Ideology/ 
Documentary-TRUTH-OR-DARE-THEORETICAL-AND-ETHICAL-CONSIDERATIONS 
.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (“[T]he nature of the film medium ensures that the 
hand of the maker must always work over the raw material on the editing table.”). 
229 See Silbey, Evidence Verité, supra note 83, at 1297-98 (suggesting changes aimed 
at “minimizing the potential for unconscious or less-than-deliberative responses to . . . 
films”); see also Silbey, Judges as Film Critics, supra note 83, at 519 (criticizing judges for 
describing film “as if it were an unimpeachable eyewitness”). 
230 See generally Silbey, Evidence Verité, supra note 83, at 1262-72, 1298 (summariz-
ing the intellectual contributions of Roland Barthes, Stanley Fish, William Mitchell, 
Errol Morris, Lennart Nilsson, Susan Sontag, John Tagg, and others on the questions 
of what photographs do, say, and “want”). 
231 Id. at 1296. 
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than we really know.”232  Errol Morris, a noted documentary filmmaker 
who has written essays on this topic for the New York Times, argues that 
“[p]hotographic evidence—like all evidence—needs to be seen in 
context.  It needs to be evaluated.  If seeing itself is belief-laden, then 
there is no seeing independent of believing, and the ‘truism’ has to be 
reversed.  Believing is seeing and not the other way around.”233 
Treating outtakes as a unique class of evidence tends to favor dis-
closure because judges will instinctively want to admit evidence that 
they believe is conclusive as to the issue at hand.  But in reality, out-
takes are less objective than many judges believe.  If journalistic work 
product is worth protecting in order to maintain a vigorous and inde-
pendent press, then it should be worth protecting for filmmakers and 
other journalists alike.  Cavalier enforcement of subpoenas for out-
takes jeopardizes society’s important goal of maintaining a free press. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES FOR FILMMAKERS 
What is the significance of a weakened privilege for outtakes?  Ber-
linger and other interested parties argued to the Second Circuit that 
upholding the district court’s order would have a chilling effect on 
Berlinger’s ability to find subjects willing to appear in documen-
taries.234  Concern about a chilling effect impeding the free flow of in-
formation to the public has been part of the conversation about the 
journalists’ privilege from its inception, and courts continue to raise 
and debate this issue in privilege cases.235  Unsurprisingly, filmmakers 
 
232 Errol Morris, Will the Real Hooded Man Please Stand Up, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
BLOG (Aug. 15, 2007, 6:13 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/ 
will-the-real-hooded-man-please-stand-up.  See generally ERROL MORRIS, BELIEVING IS 
SEEING:  OBSERVATIONS ON THE MYSTERIES OF PHOTOGRAPHY 75-95 (2011) (revisiting 
and expanding on the questions explored in his articles).   
233 Morris, supra note 232; see also HAMPE, supra note 225, at 30 (responding to the 
claim that “the camera doesn’t lie” as “nonsense” and noting that “only the mind of 
the viewer, making inferences from these shadows and color patterns, . . . gives [foot-
age] meaning”).   
234 See Brief and Special Appendix for Respondents-Appellants Joseph A. Berlinger 
et al. at 22-23, 35, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-
1918, 10-1966) (arguing that requiring Berlinger to produce outtakes would have “a 
chilling effect on his ability—and the ability of other journalists—to develop relation-
ships with sources and to make documentaries reporting on important and newswor-
thy topics”); see also Brief of Int’l Documentary Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Appellants at 14-17, Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (Nos. 10-1918, 10-1966) (“If subjects fear 
that their outtakes may be taken out of context and used against them by their adver-
saries in litigation, they will be less willing to participate.”). 
235 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (discussing the concern 
that “the flow of news will be diminished by compelling reporters” to testify before 
ISLER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:08 PM 
2012] The Future of the Journalists’ Privilege 907 
and journalists have also voiced this concern in reaction to the Ber-
linger litigation.236 
Some courts and commentators are skeptical of the chilling ef-
fect.237  Indeed, one scholar, Randall Eliason, argues that because jour-
nalism flourished for many years prior to the invention of the journal-
ists’ privilege, a privilege is not necessary to safeguard the free flow of 
information.238  Eliason maintains that because sources who disclose 
sensitive information face many potential risks, a chilling effect could 
only be present when a source, who is otherwise willing to accept 
those risks, is deterred exclusively by the possibility of his or her in-
 
grand juries); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 301-02 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the private interest of 
the party seeking disclosure “pales in comparison to the public’s interest in avoiding 
the chilling of disclosures” that can result when journalists are forced to disclose confi-
dential information); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (“We discern a lurking and subtle threat to journalists and their employers 
if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if nonconfidential, 
becomes routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled.”); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 
F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unques-
tionably threatens a journalist’s ability to secure information . . . . The deterrence ef-
fect [of] such disclosure . . . threatens freedom of the press and the public’s need to be 
informed.”); Ayala v. Ayers, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (limiting a mo-
tion to compel discovery of a manuscript for an investigative book “in deference to the 
goals of protecting the free flow of information and protecting the privacy of editorial 
processes”). 
236 See Dave Itzkoff, Michael Moore Says Judge’s Ruling Could Have ‘Chilling Effect’  
on Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES ARTSBEAT BLOG (May 7, 2010, 9:06 AM), http:// 
www.artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/michael-moore-says-judges-ruling-could-
have-chilling-effect-on-documentaries (quoting filmmaker Michael Moore as arguing that 
because of the ruling’s chilling effect, “the next whistleblower at the next corporation is 
going to think twice about showing [a filmmaker] some documents if that information 
has to be turned over to the corporation that they’re working for”); Amy Reiter, Docu-
mentary Filmmakers Rally Around CRUDE Director, SUNFILTERED (May 20, 2010), http:// 
www.sundancechannel.com/sunfiltered/2010/05/documentary-filmmakers-rally-around-
crude-director (quoting filmmakers who argue that the district court’s ruling “surely 
will have a crippling effect on the work of investigative journalists everywhere”). 
237 See, e.g., Wolf v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 201 F. App’x 430, 
433 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the “chilling effect” argument was ultimately rejected 
by the Supreme Court, which stated that the lack of a “constitutional protection for 
press informants” has “not been a serious obstacle to either the development or reten-
tion of confidential news sources by the press” (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 699)).  
See generally Jones, supra note 18, at 363-74 (presenting empirical data that fills the not-
ed gap in the debate about whether the existence of a privilege makes any difference 
in journalistic practices). 
238 See Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers and Fourth Estate Inmates:  The Misguided 
Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 417-19 (2006) (distin-
guishing a potential journalist’s privilege from those privileges already recognized by 
the law in that the former does not have the same “common law pedigree” and does 
not so closely tie to “notions of personal liberty and privacy”). 
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formation being revealed during litigation.239  By contrast, another 
scholar, David Anderson, argues: 
Where a reporter’s privilege exists, it seems to work not so much by 
providing firm assurance that the law will not permit the particular con-
fidence to be breached, but by leading sources to believe that reporters 
will refuse to disclose and that anyone seeking to force them to disclose 
will at least face some legal impediments.
240
 
Even if a privilege is not absolute, it is one of the tools that jour-
nalists can use to persuade sources to speak.  Berlinger, for one, has 
used his successful track record of quashing subpoenas for his out-
takes to convince new potential film subjects to agree to participate.241  
He specifically discussed this history with Donziger when the two con-
sidered making Crude.242  Now, Berlinger admits, “I can no longer look 
at a subject square in the eye and say if you give me access, I can pro-
tect the footage.”243 
In recent years, individuals and organizations have gathered some 
empirical support to prove the impact of subpoenas on the media and 
the newsgathering process.  Studies by scholars and the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, as well as congressional testimo-
ny, show that both the frequency of media subpoenas is increasing 
and the effect is detrimental to the newsgathering process.244  Evi-
 
239 See id. at 422-23 (arguing that such a possibility is so “remote” in regards to both 
the probability of disclosure and the time that would pass between initial publication 
and subsequent revelation of the source that it is unlikely to have a deterrent effect).  
The risks a source in a leak case can face include:  the journalist deliberately or inad-
vertently not honoring the promise of confidentiality; a source’s employer discovering 
the source’s identity through an internal investigation that may involve conducting in-
terviews under oath; and a source’s identity being uncovered to outside parties 
through e-mails or telephone records other than those possessed by the journalist.  Id. 
at 423-25. 
240 Anderson, supra note 24, at 907. For a lengthy list of articles arguing both sides 
of the debate about the necessity of the journalists’ privilege, see Jones, supra note 18, 
at 321 n.14, 324 nn.18 & 21.  
241 Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205.  In 1994, Berlinger 
successfully fought two state court subpoenas to produce his Paradise Lost outtakes.  
Declaration of Joseph A. Berlinger, supra note 116, ¶¶ 23-24. 
242 Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205. 
243 Id. 
244 See generally Jones, supra note 18, at 353-98 (analyzing qualitative and quantita-
tive survey data and concluding that a legal environment favoring media subpoenas 
imposes enough burdens on the media and the public to warrant a federal shield law).  
As of 2009, “[m]ore than a quarter of media organizations spen[t] more time and re-
sources responding to subpoenas than they did five years [prior].”  Id. at 354; see also 
RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm?  An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Re-
ceived by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 626-66 (2008) (analyzing empirical data 
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dence “suggests strongly that the recent wave of losing cases has led to 
something of a nationwide chill,” that organizations fear the financial 
and institutional burdens of challenging subpoenas, and that attor-
neys are now “more willing to subpoena the press.”245  Studies also 
show that, apart from the traditional chilling effect, the increase in 
subpoenas has resulted in self-censorship or changes to the newsgath-
ering process that are potentially detrimental to the public.246  One 
survey found a “clear trend” that media organizations, which would 
otherwise prefer to archive material, now systematically destroy notes 
and outtakes soon after the publication or broadcast of stories.247  The 
consequence of such destruction is a lack of long-term records on 
people and topics, which makes it more difficult for journalists to 
make connections between current events and past research.248  With 
newsroom budgets declining and resources diverted to defend against 
an increasing number of subpoenas, media organizations have less fi-
nancial and institutional resources to dedicate to investigative report-
ing.249  Subpoenas, then, appear to have a negative impact on the 
overall newsgathering process.250 
 
from a 2007 survey about media subpoena requests).  In the 1990s, the vast majority of 
media subpoenas, ninety-five to ninety-seven percent, were for nonconfidential infor-
mation, according to four national studies by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press.  See Fargo, supra note 71, at 356. 
245 Jones, supra note 18, at 393-94; see also Belinda Baldwin, The Death of Objectivity?, 
DOCUMENTARY, Fall 2010, at 34, 35 (“‘I was at my darkest hour,’ [Berlinger] recalls [af-
ter losing his privilege objection for the Crude outtakes], ‘questioning whether I had 
the financial and emotional resources to fight . . . .’”). 
246 See Jones, supra note 18, at 369 (noting that the specific examples included in 
survey responses, as well as the general tone of responses, “suggest that the issuance of 
subpoenas is negatively impacting relationships with potential confidential sources in a 
variety of ways, ranging from the overt to the subtle”). 
247 See id. at 364-65 (noting that several media organizations reported rarely retain-
ing journalist notes “for more than a few days after publication”); see also infra Section 
IV.C (discussing the consequences of destroying outtakes). 
248 See Jones, supra note 18, at 365 (“The quick destruction of notes, footage and 
other materials might impede investigative journalism by making it more difficult for a 
newsroom to keep helpful long-term records on potentially ongoing stories or to re-
port on a pattern of corruption or abuse that became evident only after earlier notes 
or footage were destroyed.”). 
249 See id. at 330, 356, 361-63 (noting that rising legal pressures and the recent 
economic downturn have put an enormous strain on resource-strapped media organi-
zations); see also Jones, supra note 244, at 648 (discussing how subpoenas and the risk of 
court-ordered disclosure can affect newsroom assignments); Chelsea Ide & Kanupriya 
Vashisht, Today’s Investigative Reporters Lack Resources, AZCENTRAL (May 28, 2006, 3:30 
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special01/0528bolles-stateofreporting.html 
(concluding, based on the results of an academic study about investigative reporting 
units in newspapers, that fewer investigative teams exist today than in the past due to 
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These empirical studies will not end the debates over the need for 
a privilege or how journalism would function without it.  But Ber-
linger himself says that the litigation over his outtakes already has 
changed the way he plans to approach the filmmaking process in or-
der to better protect his footage (and thus, his sources), to prevent 
himself from facing this kind of litigation again, and to convince sub-
jects to participate in documentary projects.251  Filmmakers who con-
tinue to tackle sensitive subjects will need to take steps to minimize 
the risks to themselves and their subjects.  However, many of the 
methods filmmakers have considered employing are unlikely to pro-
vide the protection they seek. 
 
the nontrivial resources they require, and pointing to “campaign[s] targeted at attack-
ing the journalist who engages in investigative reporting” as an obstacle to institutional 
investigative teams (internal quotation marks omitted)).  As traditional media dedicate 
fewer resources to long-form, in-depth investigative reporting, years-long documentary 
investigations by filmmakers like Berlinger become even more valuable to the public.  
Cf. Mary Walton, Investigative Shortfall, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Fall 2010, at 19 (noting in 
particular the decline of investigative teams at traditional news organizations). 
250 This raises a corollary question:  to what extent should courts worry about the 
chilling effect in the context of documentaries?  The Berlinger litigation will only curb 
documentary production to the extent that filmmakers or their subjects are aware of 
the outcome of the case and are unwilling to participate in future documentary pro-
jects because of it.  Lawyers, of course, are the individuals most likely to be aware of  
the case and its implications, and thus the chilling effect will arguably be most pro-
nounced for filmmakers trying to make documentaries about the legal system.  Ber-
linger has expressed doubt over whether he will ever make another movie about a law-
suit.  See Dave Itzkoff, Filmmakers Take Dual Roles in Quest for Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2012, at AR9.   
  While the benefits of a free press in general are widely accepted, the importance 
of law-genre documentary films deserves reiteration.  Compare Grosjean v. Am. Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (describing an “untrammeled press” as having shed 
“more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumen-
tality of publicity,” and noting that an “informed public opinion is the most potent of 
all restraints upon misgovernment”), with Regina Austin, The Next “New Wave”:  Law-
Genre Documentaries, Lawyering in Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 809, 817-21 (2006) (arguing that law-
genre documentaries “provide critical perspectives on the law, particularly as it is actu-
ally lived with and experienced,” put legal disputes in context in a powerful way, and 
bring to life social and political realities that underlie legal disputes), and Charles 
Musser, Film Truth, Documentary, and the Law:  Justice at the Margins, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 
963, 984 (1996) (praising law-genre documentaries for forcing the public to reflect on 
the American justice system). 
251 See Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205 (discussing an-
ticipated changes in his filmmaking). 
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A.  Confidentiality Options 
One change Berlinger intends to make is to execute confidentiality 
agreements with his subjects, promising to keep confidential any ma-
terial not released to the public in the final cut of the film or released 
on the DVD—in other words, promising to keep outtakes confiden-
tial.252  Assuming Berlinger can prove editorial and financial independ-
ence, he believes that this evidence of a confidential relationship would 
qualify his footage for the higher judicial test of Cutler and other cases, 
which requires petitioners to prove that outtakes are “highly material 
and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and 
not obtainable from other available sources.”253 
In effect, Berlinger’s proposal would require courts to recognize a 
new category of confidentiality.  His subjects would not be considered 
traditional confidential sources because their identities would be re-
vealed in any footage used in the released film.  Nor would the out-
take footage be considered confidential information in the traditional 
sense because, at the time of filming, the subjects did not communi-
cate the information to Berlinger in confidence.  Subjects would not 
know which statements or recorded moments would be included in 
the film, and thus, what would be subject to the agreement.  What 
Berlinger proposes is a new kind of confidentially, which I will refer to 
as a “confidentiality option” because it bears a similarity to a stock op-
tion:  it is exercisable by the filmmaker, with confidentiality vesting 
when the footage is left out of the final cut. 
Unfortunately, there is ample reason to doubt that courts would 
endorse such confidentiality options.  In the Berlinger litigation, the 
district court noted that all of Berlinger’s subjects in Crude “appeared 
on camera for the very purpose of having their images and words 
shown publicly,” and because Berlinger retained absolute control over 
the editing of the film, the subjects “could not possibly have [had] any 
understanding of confidentiality.”254  Other courts agree that infor-
mation must be conveyed and received in confidence to be protected.  
 
252 Id.; see also Politics of Culture:  Joe Berlinger’s ‘Crude’ vs Chevron, KCRW (June 8, 
2010), http://www.kcrw.com/etc/programs/pc/pc100608joe_berlingers_crude (inter-
viewing Berlinger and discussing his plans to employ formal confidentiality agreements 
in his future documentary projects).  Berlinger would also need to execute confidenti-
ality agreements with everyone who has access to raw footage, including producers, 
editors, sound technicians, cameramen, and assistants, in order to prove a true confi-
dential relationship existed. 
253 United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1993). 
254 In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
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In United States v. Smith, the Fifth Circuit found confidentiality to be 
“absent” because an interview subject who spoke on camera with tele-
vision reporters “wanted [the interview] aired when he gave it” and 
had “no expectation . . . that any of the information he provided was 
to be kept in confidence.”255  California appellate courts, which recog-
nize the tort of breach of confidence in the commercial context, de-
fine a confidential idea as one which “is offered to another in confi-
dence, and is voluntarily received by the offeree in confidence with 
the understanding that it is not to be disclosed to others.”256  The 
Southern District of New York, in Cohen v. City of New York, held that 
volunteers who videotaped arrests of protesters in connection with the 
Republican National Convention in 2004 expected to release footage 
depicting the arrests to defend protesters, and thus could not claim 
that unpublished outtakes were confidential.257  The court shut the 
door on the idea that filmmakers could disseminate some footage but 
expect to keep the rest confidential:  “Though [the volunteers] may 
have anticipated that they could disclose [their footage] selectively, 
disseminating what would be helpful to their cause and retaining the 
balance, this assumption was legally unwarranted.”258 
 
255 135 F.3d 963, 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1998). 
256 Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 797 n.20 (Ct. App. 
1990) (quoting Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (Ct. App. 1979)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
257 255 F.R.D. 110, 114, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
258 Id. at 121.  Nonjudicial sources also militate against recognizing this new kind 
of conditional confidentiality.  Wigmore’s treatise on evidence describes four conditions 
that must be present before a confidential privilege exists:  (1) the communications 
must originate in confidence, (2) confidentiality must be essential to the relationship 
between the parties, (3) the relationship must be one that the community believes 
ought to be fostered, and (4) the costs of disclosure must outweigh the benefits. 8 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 ( John T. 
McNaughton ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1961); see also Fargo, supra note 71, at 361-62 (of-
fering Wigmore’s view on confidentiality as an illustration of a “long legal history of 
distrust toward testimonial and evidentiary privileges in general”).  Even if filmmakers 
using a confidentiality option could prove elements (3) and (4), they will not be able 
to argue that the communications “originate in confidence,” because the confidentiali-
ty expressly attaches only after the filmmaker decides the footage will not be used in 
the film.   
 Additionally, courts might choose to characterize confidentiality options as “con-
tracts of silence” designed to suppress discovery of potential evidence, and therefore 
find the agreements void.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 554 (1932) (stat-
ing that contracts to suppress evidence are illegal and unenforceable); see also Papago 
Tribal Util. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (stating that a contract suppressing evidence is void); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 15:8, at 169 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 
2010) (“The better rule is that all bargains tending to stifle criminal prosecution, 
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In sum, then, it does not appear that use of confidentiality options 
would alter the outcome in future outtake cases:  once a filmmaker’s 
subjects freely give him the ability to use their statements or show 
their conduct, confidentiality is destroyed. 
B.  Final Cut Approval 
Filmmakers will find it difficult to satisfy the Second Circuit’s in-
dependence requirement while also qualifying for the heightened 
level of protection that accompanies confidentiality.  Consider the 
practice of filmmakers granting final cut approval to subjects.  On the 
one hand, giving subjects veto power over what footage is used 
strengthens a filmmaker’s claim to a confidential relationship with the 
subject, because the filmmaker must keep all footage private until ob-
taining the subject’s consent.  At the same time, veto agreements 
would tend to show a filmmaker’s lack of editorial independence, 
prohibiting the filmmaker from qualifying for the journalists’ privilege 
in the first place. 
Granting approval rights to subjects is an impractical, undesirable, 
and ethically questionable solution for most documentary filmmakers.  
The administrative burden of obtaining approval from every subject 
who appears in a film—or even from only the most important sub-
jects—could be enormous, if not insurmountable.  Subjects might 
withhold consent for any number of reasons, from disliking their 
physical appearance in a certain shot to rethinking the propriety of a 
statement they had made in front of the camera.  Thus, granting ap-
proval rights could lead to censorship of the film by its own subjects, 
 
whether by suppressing investigation of crime or by deterring citizens from their pub-
lic duty of assisting in the detection or punishment of crime, are void as against public 
policy.”).  For a detailed discussion of contracts of silence, see Alan E. Garfield, Promis-
es of Silence:  Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998).  Gar-
field notes that while some contracts of silence are enforced in the commercial con-
text, rarely are they upheld outside of the context of trade secrets.  Id. at 304-05, 312-
13.  Garfield also recommends that courts decline to enforce contracts of silence when 
there is an overriding public interest in the dissemination of the suppressed speech.  
Id. at 314-15.   
 Finally, courts might dismiss confidentiality options simply as a formal ploy by 
filmmakers seeking to obtain more deference from the courts, rather than a substan-
tive agreement that alters the filmmaker-subject relationship.  Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 682 n.21 (1972) (“No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail 
against demand for the truth in a court of justice.” (quoting WIGMORE supra, § 2286, at 
528)); Cohen, 255 F.R.D. at 120 (“[T]he duty to provide evidence ‘has long been con-
sidered to be almost absolute.’” (quoting Klay v. All Defendants, 425 F.3d 977, 986 
(11th Cir. 2005))). 
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rendering documentaries less reliable, less objective, and less valuable 
to the public. 
Granting subjects approval rights might even block films from be-
ing broadcast and released or prevent filmmakers from pursuing their 
projects altogether.  Filmmakers often must obtain “errors and omis-
sions insurance” before showing or distributing their films, and this 
insurance requires filmmakers to secure signed releases from subjects 
ceding complete editorial control.259  Filmmakers and distributors typ-
ically require these releases in order to preempt legal disputes when a 
film is released or to ensure creative control over the final product.260 
Because it is so difficult to meet the Second Circuit’s independ-
ence requirement and since granting approval rights to subjects is not 
a workable solution, independent filmmakers will find it nearly impos-
sible to claim their footage is confidential and protected under the 
heightened Cutler standard.  Instead, even if documentarians can 
demonstrate their editorial independence, the only protection they 
will receive is likely the weakened standard of Gonzales, under which 
outtakes are particularly vulnerable to discovery. 
C.  Destruction of Outtakes 
To avoid disclosure in future litigation, print and television jour-
nalists now systematically destroy notes and outtakes after stories are 
published.261  Documentarians, following the Berlinger decision, sug-
gested that they, too, may destroy outtakes after their films are com-
pleted to avoid the expense and aggravation of responding to sub-
poenas and the potential legal harm that could befall their subjects.262  
But the destruction of footage carries significant costs for filmmakers, 
litigants, and the public, and a legal doctrine that encourages the wide-
 
259 See AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 10.  Errors and omissions insurance 
indemnifies producers against claims such as libel, invasion of privacy, defamation, and 
copyright infringement.  See Winnie Wong, E&O to the Rescue!, INT’L DOCUMENTARY 
ASS’N (Feb. 2006), http://www.documentary.org/content/eo-rescue-0 (describing “E&O” 
insurance and how filmmakers can obtain it). 
260 See Wong, supra note 259. 
261 See Jones, supra note 18, at 364-65 & nn.186-87 (reporting a “clear trend” in 
newsrooms of destroying “materials used in the newsgathering process” within days after 
publication and listing survey responses detailing different destruction policies). 
262 See Itzkoff, supra note 236 (quoting documentary filmmaker Michael Moore 
who claims that after Berlinger filmmakers might have to start getting rid of their extra 
footage to avoid subpoenas); Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 
205 (describing the destruction of outtakes as “sadly . . . prudent”); Politics of Culture, 
supra note 252 (suggesting in an interview that Berlinger will destroy outtakes). 
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spread destruction of unused footage does not offer countervailing 
benefits.  At a minimum, subpoena rules should be crafted and en-
forced to legitimize the subpoena process in journalists’ minds so as to 
discourage them from destroying footage to protect subjects. 
Filmmakers and producers who destroy outtakes stand to lose a 
revenue source because outtakes can be licensed to future content 
producers.263  Some filmmakers also use their own outtake footage in 
later projects.  Berlinger himself has directed three films about a 
murder trial in Arkansas—the Paradise Lost films.264  Each of the se-
quels contains footage that Berlinger shot during production of the 
first film but did not include in that film.265  The destruction of out-
takes makes it more difficult to produce such longitudinal studies or 
new reports about people or events covered in the past.266 
Documentary footage, including outtakes, is also immensely valu-
able to the public and historians.267  Testifying before a panel of the 
 
263 See, e.g., Press Release, Getty Images, Getty Images Offers New Editorial Footage 
Collection with Sky News (May 20, 2010), available at http://company.gettyimages.com/ 
article_display.cfm?article_id=221 (announcing that Getty’s documentary footage ar-
chive of more than 50,000 hours is available for licensing and distribution); Documen-
tary, SCREEN VENTURES, http://www.screenventures.com/Documentary.htm (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011) (offering footage from various documentary projects for licensing); Ex-
plore Our Archives, MACNEIL/LEHRER PRODUCTIONS, http://home.macneil-lehrer.com/ 
explore-our-archives (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (offering stock documentary footage for 
licensing); HBO ARCHIVES, http://www.hboarchives.com (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) 
(making sports, entertainment, nature, and historical footage available for licensing).  
Use of outtake footage in later documentary films is common.  See, e.g., NO DIRECTION 
HOME:  BOB DYLAN (Spitfire Pictures 2005) (incorporating unreleased outtake footage 
of Bob Dylan shot by D.A. Pennebaker in the 1960s in Martin Scorsese’s 2005 film 
about Dylan); Bob Dylan:  About the Film, PBS (June 28, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/ 
wnet/americanmasters/episodes/bob-dylan/about-the-film/574 (noting the film’s use 
of Pennebaker’s outtakes). 
264 See PARADISE LOST:  THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (HBO 1996) 
(covering a triple-homicide trial); PARADISE LOST 2:  REVELATIONS (HBO 2000) (fol-
lowing up on the trial and investigating new evidence and ambiguities); PARADISE LOST 
3:  PURGATORY (HBO 2012) (documenting the efforts to obtain a new trial and the de-
fendants’ subsequent release from prison after they entered Alford pleas, which allowed 
them to plead guilty while maintaining their innocence). 
265 See Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205 (describing sub-
sequent use of footage not used in the original film). 
266 See Jones, supra note 18, at 365 (discussing how destruction of notes and foot-
age “in the name of avoiding . . . legal battles” increases the difficulty of reporting on-
going stories or presenting corruption or abuse that is evident only after original foot-
age and notes are destroyed). 
267 See Film Preservation Study:  Washington, D.C. Public Hearing, February 1993, LIBR. 
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/film/hrng93dc.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (in-
cluding testimony before the National Film Preservation Board as to the historical and 
educational value of outtakes and efforts to preserve them). 
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National Film Preservation Board in 1993 about the state of American 
film preservation, distinguished documentary filmmaker Frederick 
Wiseman asserted that outtakes may be of particular interest in future 
centuries by those attempting “to reconstruct, know and understand 
the way we live now.”268  Some institutions preserve documentary out-
takes specifically for their historical value.  For example, the Schom-
burg Center for Research in Black Culture, part of the New York Pub-
lic Library system, has preserved four million feet of unedited 
documentary footage.269  Marie Nesthus, the principal librarian of the 
Donnell Media Center of the New York Public Library, urged the 
Board to focus on preserving “[u]nreleased titles and raw footage” be-
cause, when viewed by future generations, the footage “will provide 
greater insights into the people and events of the past” and “will be 
that upon which future generations of documentary filmmakers will 
rely for their productions.”270 
Destroying outtakes also might unintentionally and undesirably 
eliminate evidence that filmmakers actually want to disclose in court 
proceedings.  Filmmakers often voluntarily turn over outtakes when 
they feel that discovery will not threaten vulnerable parties or breach 
an ethical duty.271  In 2004, for instance, a murder suspect was exoner-
ated when a lawyer found him in the background of outtakes for an 
episode of the HBO comedy series Curb Your Enthusiasm shot live at a 
baseball game at Dodger Stadium.272  In another famous example, 
Academy Award-winning documentary filmmaker Errol Morris, direc-
tor of The Thin Blue Line, which revealed a miscarriage of justice and 
ultimately contributed to the exoneration of a man on death row, 
 
268 Id. (statement of Frederick Wiseman, Independent Filmmaker). 
269 Id. (statement of Marie Nesthus, Principal Librarian, Donnell Media Center, 
New York Public Library). 
270 Id. 
271 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 245, at 34 (describing a case in which the filmmak-
ers “were happy that [their] film could speak for” a subject killed after filming had 
ended so as to “give her a voice in the trial”); E-mail from Joey Allen, Vice President of 
Prod., Pangolin Pictures to author (Oct. 18, 2010, 3:18 PM) (on file with author) (de-
scribing Pangolin Pictures’ willing compliance with prosecution and defense subpoe-
nas for outtakes from Jacked, a documentary series about the Newark Police Depart-
ment’s auto-theft unit).   
272 See Jeffrey Toobin, Face in the Crowd, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2004, at 34, 34-36.  
Although the project was not conceived as a documentary, the footage shot at the 
baseball stadium was effectively documentary footage of the crowd. 
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handed over outtakes to the courts to prove the subject’s innocence.273  
These circumstances suggest another category of people—defendants 
and victims—that would be harmed by the destruction of outtakes. 
What journalists and filmmakers object to is “not so much the 
principle of press subpoenas, nor even the increased volume in recent 
years, but rather the frequency with which subpoenas are issued in 
what reporters view as unnecessary circumstances.”274  The Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press survey found that journalists 
most dislike subpoenas by “lazy” or “aggressive” attorneys seeking 
seemingly cumulative evidence, or “fishing expeditions” that “indis-
criminately ask[] for large amounts of material” and require “a com-
plete waste of manpower and materials” to ensure compliance.275  Ber-
linger himself has implied that he would not have appealed the 
district court’s order if Chevron had not been granted access to his 
“entire files.”276 
Outtakes offer value both to filmmakers and the public—as 
sources of revenue, building blocks of future projects, historical doc-
umentation, and evidence to be used in litigation—and the journal-
ists’ privilege should be constructed to protect journalistic work prod-
uct well enough that reporters and filmmakers do not feel compelled 
to destroy outtakes preemptively on a widespread basis.  This cannot 
be done unless courts require meaningful demonstrations of both rel-
evancy and the unavailability of evidence from other sources before 
they grant subpoenas for outtakes. 
D.  Alteration of Filmmaking Practices 
Along the lines of destroying outtakes, Berlinger acknowledges 
that he will be more careful in the future about what he records in the 
 
273 See Musser, supra note 250, at 963, 976 (reporting that Morris provided the court 
with full transcripts of the interview outtakes to prove that Morris’s editing of the foot-
age for the film was not unfairly manipulative). 
274 Jones, supra note 18, at 381 (quoting Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege:  An 
Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 261 (1971)). 
275 Id. at 381-83. 
276 Court Orders Documentary Filmmaker to Hand Ecuador Footage to Chevron, DEMOCRA-
CY NOW! (May 10, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/5/10/court_orders_ 
documentary_filmmaker_to_hand (stating Berlinger’s belief that the journalists’ privi-
lege should only be pierced for specific, relevant material, which was not what was 
done in the order). 
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first place.277  He will be more judicious in turning off the cameras 
when subjects are, for instance, making off-color jokes unlikely to be 
relevant to the film.278  Such an approach likely will come at little cost 
to Berlinger; perhaps he will miss recording some material that he 
otherwise would have wanted to capture.  But the approach is unlikely 
to eliminate outtakes of all material that subjects and filmmakers, if 
they had their choice, would want to keep out of the hands of oppos-
ing parties.  Part of the excitement and draw of documentary filmmak-
ing is following stories that are yet unwritten, and filmmakers never 
know what will unfold in front of their cameras.  So even if filmmakers 
are conservative with the number of hours they capture on tape, they 
will still amass material that they would want to protect. 
Filmmakers also will need to have upfront discussions about the 
discoverability of the outtakes with subjects, particularly when the film 
concerns, or is likely to lead to, litigation.  Lacking other legal protec-
tions, filmmakers have an ethical duty when embarking upon a pro-
ject to be open with subjects about the possible legal consequences of 
amassing video documentation.279 
Filmmakers may also choose to document more formally their 
reasons for accepting or rejecting subjects’ suggestions to avoid ap-
pearing subservient to their subjects.  Such evidence could help 
filmmakers meet the Berlinger independence test; however, courts may 
view the documentation as self-serving.280 
In short, while filmmakers may be more judicious about filming or 
may destroy some footage upon release of their films, there are no 
simple ways for filmmakers to erect legal barriers around the footage 
they choose to keep.  In the wake of the Berlinger decisions, outtakes 
are particularly vulnerable.  While documentarians will still produce 
films on topics of importance to the public, litigants should feel em-
boldened by the new precedent, which misunderstands these 
filmmakers’ work. 
 
277 Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205; see also Itzkoff, su-
pra note 250 (stating that Berlinger “now tells his crew members not to roll their cam-
eras unless they’re shooting something formally intended for a film”). 
278 Telephone Interview with Joseph Berlinger, supra note 205. 
279 Cf. AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., supra note 162, at 6-8 (discussing the professional ob-
ligation by filmmakers to “do no harm” to their subjects). 
280 See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 308 n.5 (2d Cir. 2011) (de-
scribing Berlinger’s written account of his first meeting with Donziger as “self-serving”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent decisions in the Southern District of New York and the Se-
cond Circuit have revealed unfounded and potentially misleading as-
sumptions about the nature of outtakes, documentary filmmaking, 
and journalism in general.  Courts have acknowledged that noninsti-
tutional journalists and filmmakers serve the valuable role of gather-
ing and disseminating information to the public that the journalists’ 
privilege is intended to protect.  And yet in spite of this acknowl-
edgement, these decisions are just the most recent in a line of cases 
that have dramatically weakened the privilege for those individuals.  
The media has responded to this gradual weakening of the journalists’ 
privilege and the corresponding increase in subpoenas by destroying 
notes and other journalistic work product.  If courts continue to allow 
widespread discovery of journalistic work product on speculative 
grounds, then the media will respond with even more draconian 
measures that destroy materials of historical, journalistic, and eviden-
tiary importance. 
Courts should instead require a meaningful showing of both rele-
vance and unavailability of other evidentiary sources and should re-
quire narrowly tailored discovery requests, if only to legitimize the 
subpoena process in journalists’ minds and prevent them from taking 
matters into their own hands.  Courts should also abstain from de-
scribing outtakes as unique evidence that is “unimpeachably objec-
tive,” which tends to lead to the underprotection of outtakes as com-
pared to other kinds of journalistic work product.  And courts should 
stop shaping doctrine that invites judges to distinguish between legit-
imate and illegitimate forms of journalism, a task that could restrict 
the court’s flexibility as new forms of journalism emerge.  A workable, 
flexible framework already exists:  von Bulow defines who may invoke 
the privilege, and Cutler and Gonzales delineate how to adequately pro-
tect work product.  Courts should enforce these limits. 
There are steps the documentary film community should take to 
facilitate this transformation.  Aside from the study of ethics by the 
Center for Social Media, there is no authoritative source of best prac-
tices or code of accepted professional conduct for documentarians.  
Organizations like the Center for Social Media and the International 
Documentary Association should harness their resources to produce 
reports that discuss common practices and ethical considerations and 
demonstrate the compatibility of these practices with editorial inde-
pendence. 
 
